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A Critical Guide to Using the Legislative History of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to Determine the 
Amendment's Original Meaning 
GREGORY E. MAGGS 
Judges, lawyers, and scholars often look to the Fourteenth Amendment's 
legislative history for evidence of the Amendment's original meaning. Members of 
the Supreme Court, for instance, have cited floor statements, committee records, 
preliminary proposals, and other documents relating to the drafting and approval 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in many important cases. The documents containing 
this legislative history, however, are difficult to use. As explained in this Article, the 
Amendment came about through a complex process, in which Congress rejected 
several prior proposals for constitutional amendments before settling on a markedly 
different proposal that became the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the primary 
sources containing the legislative history are widely available online, some of them 
lack useful indexes and are only partially electronically searchable. In addition, 
statements made during the drafting and debate over the Fourteenth Amendment do 
not always yield clear answers to modern questions. Aggravating the situation, most 
lawyers, judges, law clerks, and legal scholars receive little or no instruction on 
how to use the documents containing the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Accordingly, they may feel unequipped either to use the legislative 
history to make claims about the Amendment's original meaning or to evaluate the 
claims of others. Even the Supreme Court appears to have difficulty with the details. 
This Article seeks to improve the situation by providing a critical guide to the 
Amendment's legislative history. 
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A Critical Guide to Using the Legislative History of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to Determine the 
Amendment's Original Meaning 
GREGORY E. MAGGS * 
INTRODUCTION 
Judges, lawyers, and scholars often look to the Fourteenth 
Amendment's legislative history for evidence of the Amendment's 
original meaning. Members of the Supreme Court, for instance, have cited 
floor statements, committee records, preliminary proposals, and other 
documents relating to the drafting and approval of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in at least twenty-five cases.' For example, in an extremely 
influential dissent in Adamson v. California,' Justice Hugo Black relied on 
statements made by Congressman John Bingham in concluding that "one 
of the chief objects" of the Due Process Clause was "to make the Bill of 
Rights, applicable to the states."' In his separate opinion in Oregon v. 
Mitchell,' Justice John Marshall Harlan relied on various actions by the 
congressional committee that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in 
concluding that Congress could not rely on its power to enforce the Equal 
Protection Clause in enacting a law to lower the voting age in the states.' 
More recently, in his separate opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago,' 
Justice Clarence Thomas relied on floor statements, committee reports, 
and similar congressional sources in concluding that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the Supreme 
Court to invalidate a state law restricting gun ownership.' This reliance on 
Professor of Law & Co-Director, National Security and U.S. Foreign Relations Law LL.M. 
Program, The George Washington University Law School. The author thanks his research assistants 
Frank Chang and Zachary Tyree for their many improvements to this Article and The George 
Washington University Law School for a generous research grant that helped to complete this Article. 
This is the sixth in a series of articles by the author on sources of the original meaning of the 
Constitution. The five other articles are A Concise Guide to Using the Articles of Confederation to 
Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397 (2017) 
(forthcoming); A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the 
Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358 (2014); A Concise Guide to the 
Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 as Evidence of the Original Meaning of the 
US. Constitution, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707 (2012); A Concise Guide to the Records of the State 
Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 457 (2009); and A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original 
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
The author conducted a Westlaw search of the Supreme Court database using the search term 
"adv: '39th Cong!' /40 (14th or Fourteenth)" and individually reviewed the cases identified. 
2 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
3 Id. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
4 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
5 Id. at 154-55 (Harlan, .1., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
6 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
7 Id. at 805-06, 827 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is not new; courts 
have referred to it continuously since the Amendment's adoption.' 
Interest in the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
limited to the courts either. For example, in the 2016 presidential election 
campaign, proponents and opponents of birthright citizenship looked to 
statements by members of the 39th Congress in 1866 about whether the 
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment makes anyone born in the 
United States automatically a U.S. citizen.' Academic writers, meanwhile, 
recently have argued about what the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment says with respect to issues such as same sex-marilage,lo 
affirmative action,' and even the recent brinksmanship between Congress 
and the President in setting the federal budget.' 
The documents containing the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are difficult to use. As explained in this Article, the 
Amendment came about through a complex process, in which Congress 
rejected several prior proposals for constitutional amendments before 
settling on a markedly different proposal that became the Fourteenth 
Amendment.13 Although the primary sources containing the legislative 
history are widely available online, some of them lack useful indices and 
are only partially electronically searchable. In addition, statements made 
during the drafting and debate over the Fourteenth Amendment do not 
always yield clear answers to modem questions. 
Aggravating the situation, most lawyers, judges, law clerks, and legal 
scholars receive little or no instruction on how to use the documents 
containing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 67 (1872) ("The most cursory glance at [the 
three Amendments added after the Civil War] discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection 
with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt 
concerning . . . their true meaning. Nor can such doubts, when any reasonably exist, be safely and 
rationally solved without a reference to that history . . ."); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth 
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 5-8 
(1949) (discussing the willingness of Supreme Court justices to "make decisions turn upon their 
reading of the historical record [sic]" in the context of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence). 
See Mark Pulliam, What Did the 14th Amendment Congress Think about 'Birthright 
Citizenship '?, AM. SPECTATOR (Aug. 24, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://spectator.org/63860 what-did-14th-
amendment-congress-think-about-birthright-citizenship/ (crediting Donald Trump for "advancing a 
national conversation on a critically important issue"). 
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same Sex Marriage, 70 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 648, 651-52 (2016) ("We think these sources all suggest that just as the word 
`person' in the Due Process Clause protects LGBTQ people, so too does the word 'person' in the Equal 
Protection Clause."). 
II See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the Black Hole 
of Constitutional Law, 89 CU -KENT L. REV. 1019, 1028 (2014) ("Some scholars and lawyers have 
sought a 'true' and certain original meaning of the Amendment, often with a self-conscious political 
agenda to undermine integration, affirmative action, and even substantive racial fairness."). 
12 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2011), hftp://ballcin.blogspot.com/2011/06/legislative-history-
of-section-four-ofhtml ("[T]he language of the Amendment went beyond this particular historical 
concern. It was stated broad terms in order to prevent future majorities in Congress from repudiating 
the federal debt to gain political advantage . . ."). 
11 See infra Section 
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Accordingly, they may feel unequipped either to use the legislative history 
to make claims about the Amendment's original meaning or to evaluate 
the claims of others. Even the Supreme Court appears to have difficulty 
with the details.' This Article seeks to improve the situation by providing 
a critical guide to the Amendment's legislative history. 
The remainder of this Article consists of five sections. Section I 
describes the primary sources containing the legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, all of which are now available on the Internet for 
free. Section II provides background for understanding the concerns that 
prompted Congress to seek a constitutional amendment. Section III 
describes various proposals for constitutional amendments that the 39th 
Congress considered, beginning with House Resolution ("H. Res.") No. 9, 
which addressed only Confederate debts, and culminating in House 
Resolution No. 127, which ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Section IV discusses different definitions of the term "original meaning" 
and explains that legislative history is useful mostly for showing the 
original intent of Congress as opposed to other types of original meaning. 
Section V identifies and discusses five typical ways in which writers rely 
on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment in making claims 
about its original meaning. Section VI then discusses three general 
problems to avoid in using legislative history. The Article then states a 
brief conclusion: jurists and scholars can and should use the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to make certain kinds of claims 
about its original meaning but must exercise caution and recognize the 
limits of their claims. 
This Article also contains three appendices. Appendix A contains the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment and other proposed constitutional 
amendments that Congress considered in 1865 and 1866. Appendix B 
provides a timeline of the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Appendix C provides a table identifying the members of Congress who 
made speeches concerning the proposed constitutional amendments. 
Before going further, three limitations require mention. First, this 
Article uses the term "legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment" 
to refer only to congressional records revealing how the House, Senate, 
and the Joint Committee on Reconstruction drafted and considered 
proposals leading to the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article does not 
cover the records of the state legislatures that ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment.' Those records are important, but must be the subject for a 
14 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (describing H.R. Res. 63 as the 
"first draft" of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was in fact one of several proposals that Congress 
considered but rejected before it drafted, amended, and approved H.R. Res. 127, which became the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
Is 
 The process by which the state legislatures approved and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
was controversial. See, e.g., Douglas H. Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 555-59 (2002) (describing and questioning the 
legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification). The issues involved are beyond the scope of 
this Article, which concerns only what happened in Congress. 
1074 	 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 
	 [Vol. 49:1069 
different article. 
Second, this Article addresses only the question of how the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment might provide evidence of the 
Amendment's original meaning. It makes no claims about when or 
whether courts should or must follow that original meaning. Other works 
thoroughly address that question!' Suffice it to say, researchers may wish 
to use the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to discover the 
Amendment's original meaning even if they do not believe the original 
meaning should determine the outcome of contemporary cases. 
Third, this guide primarily explains how to use sources of the 
legislative history to determine the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It makes no substantive claims about what the legislative 
history shows with respect to particular disputed issues. For example, it 
does not purport to resolve questions such as whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a right to possess 
firearms or whether the Due Process Clause guarantees a liberty of 
contract. Instead, this guide seeks to help others make or evaluate 
substantive claims of this type. 
I. PRIMARY SOURCES OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Researchers can find most of the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in six primary sources, all of which are available on the 
Internet for free. The following discussion describes these sources and 
how to access them. 
A. Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe 
The 39th Congress drafted and approved the Fourteenth Amendment 
during its first session, which ran from December 4, 1865, through July 
28, 1866.17 Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe contains a transcription 
of the floor debates in Congress during this period!' The Supreme Court, 
accordingly, has cited Volume 36 in numerous Fourteenth Amendment 
decisions.19 Researchers can access Volume 36 online without cost at the 
Library of Congress's Century of Lawmaking website.' Unfortunately, 
except for the indices, the online version is not stored in an electronically 
16 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 13
- 9 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the courts should interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment according to its original meaning); Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 107 Nw. U.L. REV. 1627, 1629 -30 (2013) (arguing that the case for 
following the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is weaker than arguments for following 
the original meaning in the rest of the Constitution because of the highly controversial manner in which 
the states ratified the Amendment). 
17 For the dates upon which the 39th Congress convened and adjourned, see Congressional 
Globe: Debate and Proceedings, 1833-73, LIBR. OF CONG., http://www.memory.loc.gov/ 
ammem/amlaw/Iwcglink.html [https:l/perma.cc/EV4N-V879] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). Prior to its 
"first" session, Congress also met in a "special session" from March 4, 1865 to March 11, 1865. Id. 
18 id.  
19 See supra note 1 (describing Westlaw search). 
20 LIBR. OF CONG., supra note 17. 
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searchable format. 
The Congressional Globe is an accurate and reliable source. It was a 
non-partisan journal funded and published by Francis Preston Blair and 
John C. Rives from 1833 until 1873, with funding from the Senate starting 
in 1848 and funding from the House starting in 1850.21 Its goal was to 
report all Congressional floor debates, much like the Congressional 
Record does today.' The Congressional Globe started the practice of 
"printing debates as first-person narratives rather than third-person 
summations."' In addition, despite the lack of electronic recording 
equipment in the 1860s, the Congressional Globe achieved almost 
verbatim accounts of the floor debates by employing "a corps of reporters 
trained in the latest stenographic techniques."' 
Starting in 1865, the Congressional Globe was published on a daily 
basis.' Each member of Congress received twenty-four copies.26 
Accordingly, the Congressional Globe was widely available almost 
immediately after every debate. The debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment were therefore neither secret nor difficult for interested 
outsiders to follow. 
Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe contains four parts relevant to 
researching the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment: the main 
body of the volume, the index to the main body, the appendix, and the 
index to the appendix. The main body, which occupies pages 1 to 4,312, 
contains the Senate and House debates from the entire first session. In 
these pages, readers can learn exactly what congressional leaders said 
about proposals to amend the Constitution. For example, on May 23, 1866, 
Senator John Howard famously gave a section-by-section explanation of 
H.R. Res. 127, the five-part joint resolution that ultimately became the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' 
The 104-page index to the main body of Volume 36 is located on 
21 Historical Events, BLAIR HOUSE, http://vvww.blairhouse.org/history/historical-events/globe-
and-congressional-globe [https://perma.ec/BP6T-8RAS] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017); Reporters of 
Debate and the Congressional Record, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/briefing/Reporters _Debate Congressional_Record.htm [https://perma.cc/2GDG-
NTHY]  (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) [hereinafter SENATE REPORTERS OF DEBATE]. 
22 See An Overview of the Congressional Record and Its Predecessor Publications: A Research 
Guide, L. LIBR. SOC'Y OF WASH., D.C., http://wwwilsdc.org/congressional-record-overview 
[https://perma.cc/R2S7-AN26] (last updated Jan. 2016) [hereinafter Overview of Congressional 
Publications] ("The Congressional Record contains House and Senate floor proceedings, substantially 
verbatim transcripts of floor debates and remarks, notice of all bills introduced, full text of all 
conference committee reports, notices of committee and Presidential actions and communications, and 
statements or documents submitted by members of Congress for publication."). 
23 SENATE REPORTERS OF DEBATE, supra note 21; see also Overview of Congressional 
Publications, supra note 22, at n.11 ("After the introduction and adoption of the phonetic shorthand . 
. . near verbatim reporting of congressional debate became a reality for the first time . . ."). 
24 SENATE REPORTERS OF DEBATE, supra note 21. 
25 Act of Mar. 2, 1865, ch. 73, § 7, 13 Stat. 460 (1865). 
26 See MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR SECOND 
SESSION OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS 48 (1867), https://books.google.com/books?id  
rHBHAQAAIAAJ [https://perma.cc/ERN7-EDH8]  (detailing the statement of disbursements). 
27 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764-68 (1866) (recording Sen. Howard, speaking 
with interruptions by others). 
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pages iii-cvi. The Library of Congress has retyped the index to Volume 36 
to make it electronically searchable.' Unfortunately, using the index is 
difficult. Searching the index for what might seem like important terms, 
such as "equal protection" or "privileges or immunities," yields no results. 
Instead, the search terms that produce the most relevant passages are "H. 
R. No. 9," "H. R. No. 51," "H. R. No. 63," and "H. R. No. 127." These 
terms refer to four joint resolutions proposing amendments to the 
Constitution that, as explained below, the House and Senate seriously 
considered in its first session.29 The House and Senate ultimately approved 
H.R. Res. 127, and it became the Fourteenth Amendment.' 
Volumes of the Congressional Globe contained appendices in which 
members of Congress could have the text of speeches and other documents 
printed.' The 444-page appendix to Volume 36 includes many important 
comments on the proposed constitutional amendments during the spring 
of 1866 which researchers definitely should not overlook. For example, 
the appendix contains a speech by Representative Andre Jackson Rogers 
on February 26, 1866, in which he predicted that the constitutional 
amendment proposed in H.R. Res. 63 would require school 
desegregation.' The Solicitor General of the United States later cited this 
statement in Brown v. Board of Education as important evidence of the 
original intent of Congress in approving the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
Sometimes the record of the main body of Volume 36 contains explicit 
references to the appendix. For instance, on June 13, 1866, the records of 
the debates show that Representative Joseph H. DeFrees asked permission 
"to print some remarks upon this question [of whether to approve H.R. 
Res. 127], which I had not had an opportunity of delivering."' 
Representative DeFrees's remarks then appear in the appendix.' In other 
instances, the appendix includes speeches for which there is no reference 
in the main body of Volume 36. As a result, the extent of Congress's 
knowledge of what was in the appendix is not always clear. Volume 36 
also includes a five-page index to the appendix. Although the Library of 
Congress has retyped this index to make it electronically searchable, it is 
still difficult to use. The index is organized by speaker rather than by topic, 
and many of the entries are described simply as "incidental remarks" 
20 LIBR. OF CONG., CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE, 1833-1873: INDEX TO 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2017), https://memoryloc.gov/ammem/amlawnwcglink.html [https://perma.cc/ 
N HX3-W6M11]. 
29 See infra Section 111. 
30 Fourteenth Amendment and Citizenship, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/law/help/ 
citizenship/fourteenth amendment citizenship.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ 
P7DB-RBUM]. 
31 Overview of Congressional Publications, supra note 22. 
32 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at app. 134 (comments of Rep. Rogers on H.R. Res. 63). 
33 See Supp. Brief for the United States on Reargument at 38-41, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10), 1953 WL 78291, at *38-40 (quoting Joint Committee members in 
support of equal protection, including with respect to education, where the majority "did not deny that 
charge"). 
34 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3148. 
Id. at app. 226-28. 
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without further elaboration on the subject. As a result, researchers need to 
read the entire appendix to find what they are looking for. 
The Uniforin System of Citation (the "Bluebook") recommends that 
writers cite the Congressional Globe according to the Congress number 
and session number but not volume number.' Accordingly, a citation of 
page 3,148 of Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe would be "CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866)." In writing about the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment, using a parenthetical phrase to 
indicate the date, the speaker, and the subject is also usually a helpful 
practice. 
B. The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 
A second primary source containing important legislative history is 
"The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, 39th 
Congress, 1865-1867" (hereinafter "Journal of the Joint Committee").' 
Researchers can find the full text of this official congressional document 
reprinted in a 1914 book of the same name by Benjamin Burks Kendrick.' 
The Journal of the Joint Committee documents the proceedings of the 
congressional committee that drafted and introduced the proposed 
constitutional amendments designated as H.R. Res. 51, 63, and 127 but not 
H.R. Res. 9, which was proposed by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary. The Kendrick book, which is available online for free in 
searchable form, contains the text of the Journal, a helpful introduction, 
and eight chapters about the history of the Joint Committee.' Members of 
the Supreme Court have cited the Journal of the Joint Committee in a 
number of cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.' 
Congress created the "Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction" 
(hereinafter the "Joint Committee") on December 14, 1865.4' The Joint 
Committee included nine members of the House of Representatives and 
six Senators. The chair was Representative Thaddeus Stevens (R-PA) and 
the other House members were John A. Bingham (R-OH), Henry Blow 
(R-MO), George Boutwell (R-MA), Roscoe Conkling (R-NY), Henry 
Grider (D-KY), Justin Morrill (R-VT), Andrew Jackson Rogers (D-NJ), 
36 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 130 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. 
eds., 20th ed. 2015). 
n 39TH CONG., THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 
(1865-1867), reprinted in BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF 
FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 39-129 (1914). 
38 Id.  
n Id. at 17-36 (introduction), 138-415 (chapters I -VIM. 
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 827 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (citing the JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
RECONSTRUCTION as evidence that the Committee's Report was widely circulated); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 521 (1997) (relying on the same to describe objections expressed before the final 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 151 (1994) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing to the Journal to quote initial drafts of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 44 (1973) ("[T]he Journal . . . enables us to trace 
the evolution of the draft language in the Committee . . . "). 
41 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 57. 
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and Elihu Washbume (R-IL). The Senate members were William 
Fessenden (R-ME), James W. Grimes (R-IA), Ira Harris (R-NY), Jacob 
Howard (R-MI), Reverdy Johnson (D-MD), and George Henry Williams 
(R-OR).42 All of the members of the Committee were from states that had 
not joined the Confederacy because, as discussed in depth below, the 39th 
Congress refused to seat members from the former Confederate states even 
thougjh President Johnson had reconstructed their governments.' 
The Republicans outnumbered the Democrats on the Joint Committee 
by a majority of 12-3, and they generally supported stronger measures than 
the Democrats. Important differences also existed among the Republicans, 
with some Republicans being moderate and others self-described as 
"radical." Good examples of the difference between these Republicans can 
be seen in Senator Jacob M. Howard and Representative Thaddeus 
Stevens, who each led the drive for approval of H.R. Res. 127 in their 
respective chambers of Congress. Senator Howard, one of the founders of 
the Republican Party and a close ally of President Lincoln, was a 
moderate. In reading his speeches in the Congressional Globe, it is 
impossible not to observe his calm reasonableness. For instance, whenever 
an opponent suggested a change to weaken the Fourteenth Amendment, 
his typical, patient reply was: "I hope, sir, that this amendment will not be 
adopted.' Representative Stevens was a radical. Throughout the Civil 
War, he was impatient with President Lincoln's slow action on 
emancipation. He was markedly more expressive when addressing those 
who disagreed with proposed amendments. A typical illustration was his 
comment on section 4, which prohibited payment of Confederate debts—
a provision that, he insisted, "will secure the approbation of all but 
traitors."' 
As described in Section III below, the Joint Committee drafted three 
key proposals for constitutional amendments in the spring of 1866: H.R. 
Res. 51, H.R. Res. 63, and H.R. Res. 127.46 (The House Committee on the 
Judiciary drafted H.R. Res. 9, another important proposal discussed 
below.47) H.R. Res. 127, which closely resembled the other proposals, 
ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason, the Joint 
Committee's records are a key part of the Amendment's legislative 
history. 
The Journal of the Joint Committee describes the drafts that were 
before the Joint Committee, the proposed amendments to those drafts, and 
the votes that the Joint Committee took on the drafts. Although the Journal 
of the Joint Committee does not contain speeches or debates by its 
members regarding the proposal that became the Fourteenth Amendment, 
42 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 38-39 (listing members in the JOURNAL OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE); see also id at 155-97 (describing the committee members). 
' See infra Section 11.C. 
44 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2895. 
45 Id. at 3148. 
46 See infra Section 
42 See infra Section 111.A. 
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looking at the revisions and amendments gives clues as to what the 
Committee members were thinking. For example, on April 21, 1866, the 
original version of the proposal that became H.R. Res. 127 had a provision 
saying: "Debts incurred in aid of insurrection . . . shall not be paid by any 
state nor by the United States."" The same day, Representative Rogers 
moved to strike the words "by any state nor."' But the motion was 
rejected, receiving a vote of three yeas and nine nays." This action shows 
that the Joint Committee considered a proposal to bar only the United 
States from paying former Confederate debts, but specifically rejected the 
idea. 
C. The Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction 
A third primary source of the legislative history is the "Report of the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction" (hereinafter the "Report of the Joint 
Committee").51 Members of the Supreme Court have cited this 800-page 
document in several cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.52 The 
Report of the Joint Committee is also available for free on the Internet in 
a searchable format.' 
During the spring of 1866, in addition to drafting and proposing 
constitutional amendments, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction also 
investigated conditions in the former Confederate states. The members of 
the Joint Committee called scores of witnesses to testify. The Committee's 
Report sharply criticized President Johnson's efforts to reconstruct the 
former Confederate states,' made recommendations for how Congress 
48 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84. 
49 1d. at 86. 
" Id 
51 JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
RECONSTRUCTION (1st Sess. 1866), https://books.google.com/books?id=dUgWAAAAYAAJ 
[https://perma.cc/SYX4-FDD4]  [hereinafter REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE]. 
" See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 772-73 nn.19, 21 (2010) (using 
information in the REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE to provide the historical context behind the 
Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 3071 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that the Joint Committee's Report recommended the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and noting that it "justiflied] its recommendation" by cataloguing cases where former slave states 
abused civil rights); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 194 n.4 (1989) (citing the 
REPORT OF THE JOINT CommrrrEE, which speaks about incidences of violence against freedmen), 
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized 
in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 268-69 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Joint Committee submitted 
the Fourteenth Amendment to Congress "in the hope its imperfections may be cured"), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XXVI; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 69, 
108 09 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing the REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE in an analysis of 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted as applying the Bill of Rights to the states), 
overruled in part, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
53 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51. 
" See id. at VIII IX (criticizing President Johnson's decision to reorganize and stating that "[a]s 
President of the United States, he had no power, except to execute the laws of the land as Chief 
Magistrate"). 
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should proceed with reconstruction," and faulted the former Confederate 
states for their generally abysmal treatment of emancipated slaves.' The 
Joint Committee completed this report and voted to send it to the House 
and Senate on June 6, 1866.5' Members of the Committee then introduced 
the Report into the House and Senate on June 8, 1866.58 
The Report of the Joint Committee may be relevant to claims about 
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment for two reasons. First, 
the Report explains why the Committee thought Congress should pass 
H.R. Res. 127. A key passage of the Report says: 
The conclusion of your committee therefore is, that the so-
called Confederate States are not, at present, entitled to 
representation in the Congress of the United States; that, 
before allowing such representation, adequate security for 
future peace and safety should be required; that this can only 
be found in such changes of the organic law as shall 
determine the civil rights and privileges of all citizens in all 
parts of the republic, shall place representation on an 
equitable basis, shall fix a stigma upon treason, and protect 
the loyal people against future claims for the expenses 
incurred in support of rebellion and for manumitted slaves, 
together with an express grant of power in Congress to 
enforce those provisions. To this end they offer a joint 
resolution for amending the Constitution of the United States 
59 
. . . . 
Second, the Report provides background regarding the problems that 
Congress perceived in 1866 and therefore presumably wished to address 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. As Benjamin Kendrick put it, "the 
testimony taken by the joint committee on reconstruction served as the 
raison d'etre of the fourteenth amendment."' 
The Report of the Joint Committee, however, did not have much direct 
influence on the House and Senate as they considered H.R. Res. 127. The 
Joint Committee did not complete the Report until June 6, 1866,61 and the 
55 Id. at XXI (noting that the Joint Committee made specific recommendations, which are the 
"result of mutual concession, after a long and careful comparison of conflicting opinions"). 
56 Id. at XVI—XVII (stating that the insurgent states are responsible for showing that they "accept 
the results of the war" and "extend[] to all classes of citizens equal rights and privileges," and noting 
that "[title feeling in many portions of the country towards emancipated slaves, especially among the 
uneducated and ignorant, is one of vindictive and malicious hatred... . There is no general disposition 
to place the colored race .. . upon terms even of civil equality"). 
n See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 120 ("The Chairmen of the Senate and House portions of the 
Joint Committee were instructed to submit the report just adopted to their respective houses."). 
Ss See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3051 ("Mr. Stevens, from the joint committee on 
reconstruction, submitted a written report .. ."); see also id. at 3038 (report introduced into the Senate 
by Sen. Fessenden). 
59 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at XXI. 
6° KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 264. 
61 Id. at 120. 
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Report was not introduced into the House and Senate until June 8, 1866.62 
This was too late because, as described below, the House initially 
approved the original version of H.R. Res. 127 on May 10, the Senate 
approved an amended version on June 8, and the House then also approved 
the amended version on June 9.63 But members of Congress may have 
anticipated what the Report would say even before it was formally 
introduced. 
On June 21, 1866, Congress passed a resolution directing the 
Government Printing Office to print 100,000 copies of the Report.64 
Members of Congress distributed this Report widely in the fall of 1866 in 
support of their re-election campaigns.' 
D. The House Journal, Senate Journal, and the Bills and Resolutions of 
the 39th Congress 
Three additional primary sources containing the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment are the House Journal, the Senate Journal, and 
the Library of Congress' collection of Congress' bills and resolutions. 
Under the Constitution, the House and Senate each have a duty to keep a 
"Journal of [their] Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, 
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy ."66 The 
House and Senate fulfilled this duty in 1866 with official journals, the full 
text of which are available in a searchable format at the Library of 
Congress's website.67 Although the House and Senate Journals do not 
contain floor debates, they record all of the official proceedings of the 
House and Senate, such as the introduction of resolutions, the votes on 
resolutions, and so forth. It is often easier to determine the progress of 
resolutions, such as H.R. Res. 127, by searching the Journals instead of 
trying to follow the index to the Congressional Globe. 
The Library of Congress's website also contains a collection of most 
(but not all) of the 39th Congress' bills and resolutions.' This collection 
is useful because the Congressional Globe includes the full text of bills 
and resolutions only if they were read on the House or Senate floors, and 
62 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3038, 3051. 
63 See infra Section 111.D (describing the approval of H.R. Res. 127, the joint resolution that 
became the Fourteenth Amendment). 
64 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3325-26 (adopting the resolution to "Met one hundred 
thousand copies of the majority and minority reports be printed together"). 
65 See KENDRICK, supra 37, at 264-65 ("[T]he testimony taken by the joint committee on 
reconstruction served as . . . a campaign document for the memorable election of 1866. 150,000 copies 
were printed in order that senators and representatives might distribute them among their 
constituents."). 
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, el. 3. 
39T0 CONG., 1sT SESS., H. JOURNAL (1866), https://memory.loc.gov/arranemi 
amlaw/lwhj.html [https://perma.cc/39BL-AZMW]; 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. JOURNAL (1866), 
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/Iwsj.html [https://perma.cc/JLT3-XDTW].  
68 A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 
1774-1873, L1BR. OF CONG., https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwhbsb.html [https://perma.cc/ 
98DQ-BMEN] (last visited Feb. I, 2017). 
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sometimes they were not. For example, the Congressional Globe records 
that S. Res. 9, a proposal for amending the Constitution, was introduced 
on January 5, 1866.69 As noted briefly below,' this proposed 
constitutional amendment addressed the payment of Confederate debts. 
The Congressional Globe, however, does not contain the text of S. Res. 9 
because the proposal was not read aloud.' The Library of Congress's 
website provides information about when S. Res. 9 was introduced into 
Congress,72 and a link to the complete text of the resolution.73 The website 
contains similar information for most of the proposed constitutional 
amendments that the 39th Congress considered. 
II. CONCERNS OF THE 39TH CONGRESS 
A common impulse in researching the legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to open Volume 36 of the Congressional Globe 
and then immediately begin looking for pertinent statements by members 
of the House and Senate. But many who attempt this effort soon find that 
reading the congressional debates is somewhat like watching a confusing 
play with numerous actors and a complex plot. What makes the drama 
especially challenging to follow is that the actors seem to have skipped the 
first several acts of the play; the speakers all seem to know what has 
happened in the past, but they do not necessarily share this history in their 
floor statements. 
Knowing something of the context in which the Amendment arose 
may help. Each of the Fourteenth Amendment's five sections addresses 
one or more serious concerns that Congress had in 1865 and 1866.74 These 
concerns were not entirely new. Congress had attempted to address most 
of them with other measures, but these other measures had proven 
inadequate for one reason or another. Congress ultimately concluded that 
amending the Constitution would provide a solution. At the risk of 
oversimplifying complex issues, the following discussion introduces some 
of the matters that concerned Congress. 
A. Citizenship and Civil Rights 
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment contains two sentences. The 
first sentence addresses citizenship: 
See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 129 ("[Rep]. Sumner asked, and by unanimous consent 
obtained, leave to introduce a joint resolution (SR. No. 9) proposing an amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States for the protection of the national debt and the rejection of any rebel debt . ."). 
' See infra Section 111.B (discussing the 1866 proposal, S.R. No. 9, which proposed an 
amendment to the Constitution to address the national debt). 
71 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 129 (noting that the proposal was "read twice by its title" 
and "ordered to be printed," but was not read aloud). 
n S. Res. 9, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865) (available at https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?hlaw:9:Itempb-ammem_osdk:: [hftps://perma.cc/3S44-LHKT]).  
" Id. 
" See infra Section II (discussing the concerns that Congress was contemplating when drafting 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside.75 
The second sentence, broadly speaking, requires state governments to 
respect civil rights: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 
Before digging into floor statements about the meaning of these 
provisions, researchers may benefit from the following seven important 
pieces of background information about why Congress was concerned 
with citizenship and civil rights. 
First, shortly before the Civil War, the Supreme Court had held, in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford,' that persons of African descent, whether free or 
slave, could never be citizens of the United States or of any state.78 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment had abolished slavery, and the Dred 
Scott decision was thorouggily discredited in the North,79 the Court's 
holding on the citizenship issue loomed over efforts to reconstruct the 
South. For example, in an important speech on January 25, 1866, 
Representative Bingham cited the Dred Scott decision and criticized the 
possible exclusion of freed slaves from citizenship.' Likewise, on June 8, 
1866, Senator Henderson justified section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
by criticizing the Court's reasoning in Dred Scott.' In his view, section 1 
would restore the correct view of the Constitution. "It makes plain," he 
" U.S. awn'. amend. XIV, § I. 
76 Id. 
77 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
n See id. at 407 ("In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the 
language used in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had 
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then [i.e., 
at the time of the Constitution's ratification] acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be 
included in the general words used in that memorable instrument."). 
n On June 16, 1858, Abraham Lincoln denounced the Dred Scott decision in his "House 
Divided" speech, declaring that the Dred Scott decision "compounded" the "machinery" that would 
lead to slavery becoming lawful in all states, both Northern and Southern. Abraham Lincoln, A House 
Divided, Address Before the Republican State Convention (June 6, 1858), in 2 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 63 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953). 
" See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 430 ("I might as well say in this connection that the 
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, even in the Dred Scott decision, were compelled 
to recognize the principle for which I contend this day . . . there are none but free citizens in the 
Republic .... the Constitution must be amended: I agree, if the late rebel States would make no denial 
of right to the emancipated citizens no amendment would be needed. But they will make denial."). 
' I See id. at 3032 ("The great error into which Chief Justice Taney falls consists in the fact that 
he arbitrary excluded all negroes, though free, from this sovereignty. He unfortunately rejected the 
text of the Constitution itself . . . In forming his opinion he abandoned the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence ...."). 
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said, "only what was rendered doubtful."' 
Second, after the Civil War, the Southern states were systematically 
denying civil rights to former slaves. One of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction's principal tasks was to gather information about 
conditions in the South in order to determine the legislative measures 
necessary for restoring the Union. The Committee called more than 125 
witnesses who testified about the social, political, and legal conditions 
prevailing in the former Confederate states." Many of these witnesses 
provided information about the deplorable treatment of former slaves. For 
example, Brevet Major General Edward Hatch, who had various 
responsibilities in the military government, testified on January 25, 1866, 
that former slaves were still being forced to work in Mississippi, that poor 
whites of Alabama would never recognize blacks as part of the population, 
and that former slaves were being murdered in Georgia." Other witnesses 
made similar remarks.85 Based on such testimony, the Joint Committee 
made addressing civil rights a top priority. 
Third, the Supreme Court held before the Civil War, in Barron v. 
Baltimore,' that the Bill of Rights imposes limitations only on the federal 
government, and not on the states." Under the logic of this decision, the 
southern state governments could deny due process of law, jury trials, and 
so forth to former slaves (or anyone else) without violating the 
Constitution. Members of the 39th Congress were aware of this federalism 
issue and were unhappy about it. For example, on April 10, 1866, 
Representative John Bingham, a prominent member of the Joint 
Committee, spoke critically of Barron." Urging Congress to take action, 
he said: "Is the bill of rights to stand in our Constitution hereafter, as in 
the past five years within eleven States [i.e. the states making up the 
Confederacy], a mere dead letter? It is absolutely essential to the safety of 
the people that it should be enforced."89 
Fourth, although the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth 
82 
 Id. at 3031. 
n See KENDRICK, .supra note 37, at 267-68 (stating that "a hundred and twenty-five persons" 
were questioned about their living conditions and "the treatment accorded to them by the whites"). 
84 See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at pt. III, 4-5, 8 (statement of Brevet 
Major Gen. Edward Hatch) ("I found bands of 'regulators,' many of them lately soldiers in the rebel 
anny, going about the country to see that the negroes worked.... So far as any love, or regard, or care 
for the negro, or the slave, I have never seen any of it. . . . [1] have known negroes to be killed [in 
Georgia] without any provocation at all."). 
as See, e.g., id at pt. III, 2-4 (statement of Mr. Albert Warren Kelsey) (testifying about several 
instances of violence towards freedmen, include an instance where a man was "shot . dead out of 
mere wantonness"); id. at pt. III, 8 (statement of Brevet Brigadier Gen. George E. Spencer) ("In the 
large slaveholding counties the treatment of the negro is terrible in the extreme. In Pickens county 
[Alabama] several negroes have been murdered."). 
" 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
87 See id at 250-51 (holding that the Just Compensation Clause in the Fifth Amendment was 
intended solely as a limit on the power of the federal government, not the power of state governments). 
" See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1089-94 (statement of Rep. John Bingham) (criticizing 
the decision in Barron for failing to hold states responsible for the provisions in the Bill of Rights). 
" Id. at 1090. 
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Amendment had already outlawed slavery, these measures by themselves 
did not guarantee equal civil rights to former slaves. President Lincoln 
issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, while the Civil 
War was still being fought." Using his power as Commander in Chief, 
President Lincoln declared certain states and portions of states to be in 
Rebellion against the government.' And "as a fit and necessary war 
measure for suppressing said rebellion," President Lincoln ordered that 
"all persons held as slaves within said designated states, and parts of states, 
are, and henceforward shall be, free . . . ."92. President Lincoln advised the 
freed slaves "to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-
defence," and recommended that "they labor faithfully for reasonable 
wages."93 But the Proclamation did not make any further provision for the 
welfare of freed slaves. 
The Thirteenth Amendment was approved by the Senate on April 8, 
1864, and the House on January 31, 1865.' On December 18, 1865, 
Secretary of State William H. Seward announced that twenty-seven of 
thirty-six states had ratified the Amendment, which was the necessary 
three-quarters required for amending the Constitution.' The Thirteenth 
Amendment declared that "[n] either slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . 
shall exist within the United States" and gave Congress the power to 
enforce this prohibition.' But ending slavery was not, by itself, sufficient 
to guarantee equal rights or citizenship to former slaves. 
Fifth, in March 1865, Congress passed the Freedman's Bureau Act.97 
Although this statute sought to aid former slaves, it did not address civil 
rights or citizenship. The Freedman's Bureau Act provided that the federal 
government could lease or sell up to forty acres of confiscated and 
abandoned lands "to every male citizen, whether refugee or freedman.' 
This measure was important because, at least in theory, it enabled many 
newly freed slaves to become independent subsistence farmers. But the 
Act went no further than this on issues of equality. 
Sixth, at the start of its first session, the 39th Congress unsuccessfully 
attempted to expand the Freedman's Bureau Act. Senate Bill No. 60, 
commonly called the Second Freedman's Bureau Bill, would have 
required the President to extend military protection throughout a state 
whenever the state denied any "negroes, mulattoes, freedmen . . . on 
account of race [or] color" any of the "civil rights or immunities belonging 
" Presidential Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268, 1268 (Jan. 1, 1863). 
91 Id 
92 Id. at 1268-69. 
va Id. at 1269. 
94 H. R. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 168-71 (1865), https://memory.loc.goviatnmem/ 
amlaw/lwhj.htinl [https://perma.cc/5DP4-8MD5];  S. JOURNAL, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 13 (1864), 
https://memory.loc.goviammem/amlaw/lwsj.html [https://perma.cc/7N4F-JCX11].  
95 
 13 Stat. 774 app. 52 (1865). 
96 
 U.S. CONST. amend. X111. 
S. Res. 90, 38th Cong. (1865) (enacted). 
"Id. at 508. 
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to white persons" or denied the "full and equal benefit of all laws."" The 
Bill also would have made it a crime, triable by a military court, to deprive 
any such person of "any civil right secured to white persons . . ."" The 
Senate and House passed the bill on January 25 and February 6, 1866, 
respectively.'" President Johnson, however, vetoed the bill on February 
19, 1866.102 In his veto message, President Johnson said, "I share with 
Congress the strongest desire to secure to the freedmen the full enjoyment 
of their freedom and property and their entire independence and equality 
in making contracts for their labor."103 But he objected to the extension of 
military jurisdiction and trials by military tribunals.' The Senate 
attempted but failed to override the veto on February 20, 1866." 
Seventh, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 addressed many of Congress's 
concerns about citizenship and civil rights, but Congress worried about the 
Act's constitutionality and permanence. The Senate first passed the bill 
that became this Act on February 2, 1866,106 and the House first passed 
the bill on March 13, 1866.107 President Johnson, however, vetoed the bill 
on March 27, 1866.108 The Senate and House then voted to override 
President Johnson's veto,109 and the Civil Rights Act became law on April 
9, 1866,11° two months before Congress approved H.R. Res. 127, which 
when ratified by the states became the Fourteenth Amendment."' 
Addressing citizenship in words almost identical to those of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act declared: "That all persons 
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding 
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States . 
. . ."112 The Act then addressed certain specified civil rights by saying: 
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to 
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
99 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 421. 
Id. at 318. 
101 See id. at 421 (passing the bill in the Senate); id at 688 (passing the bill in the House). 
102 Veto Messages, in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 
398 (1897) [hereinafter "Veto Messages"]. 
1' Id. 
See id at 398 99 (outlining objections to the military jurisdiction and military tribunal 
provisions). 
105 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 943. 
106 See id. at 606-07 (passing the bill in the Senate). 
107 See id. at 1367 (passing the bill in the House). 
'° Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 405. 
th9 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1861. 
110 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27-29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981- 
82 (1952)). 
I" CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3149. 
12 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 
(1952)). 
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purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
notwithstanding.113 
President Johnson believed that making all former slaves citizens was 
a rash decision. In his veto message, he asked "whether, when eleven of 
the thirty-six States are unrepresented in Congress at the present time, it is 
sound policy to make our entire colored population . . . citizens of the 
United States."'" He objected to the non-discrimination provision on 
federalism grounds, arguing that "every subject embraced in the 
enumeration of rights contained in this bill has been considered as 
exclusively belonging to the States."15  
Despite eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, many in 
Congress may still have felt that the Constitution should address 
citizenship and civil rights. Doubt existed about whether Congress could 
overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott by statute,116 and 
President Johnson's veto had raised questions about the constitutionality 
of the Civil Rights Act.' In addition, the 39th Congress may have worried 
that a later Congress, with representatives from the former Confederate 
states, would overturn this provision. For these reasons, Congress may 
have felt the need to place a provision like section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Constitution. 
B. Representation in Congress 
Congress was also concerned about representation of the former 
Confederate states in the House of Representatives. The first sentence of 
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment says: "Representatives shall be 
apportioned among the several states according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding 
Indians not taxed."18  
This sentence repeats the general rule of Article I, section 2, clause 3 
of the Constitution on the apportionment of representatives, but it 
eliminates the former "Three-Fifths Compromise" under which slaves 
counted as three-fifths of a person for the purpose of determining the 
1" Id. 
114 Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 406. 
1 5 Id. at 407. 
116 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of the Rights of Citizenship, 56 DRAKE 
L. REV. 1015, 1027 (2008) ("Uncertainty over Congress's authority to legislatively overrule the Dred 
Scott decision prompted Congress to create birthright citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Citizenship Clause."). 
17 See Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 398 ("[T]he bill before me contains provisions which 
in my opinion are not warranted by the Constitution .. .."). 
18 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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number of representatives of a state.' This change reflected the 
obsolescence of the Three-Fifths Compromise after the Thirteenth 
Amendment ended slavery. 
The second sentence of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
more complicated. It provides that states will lose some of their 
representation if they do not allow all "male inhabitants . . . twenty-one 
years of age" to vote.' The second sentence says in full: 
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and 
judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such state." 
A brief review of history is necessary to understand what Congress 
was concerned about in approving this provision. The Civil War 
essentially ended when Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to 
Union General Ulysses S. Grant on April 9, 1865.122 
 Just six days later, on 
April 15, 1865, John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Abraham 
Lincoln.123 Vice President Andrew Johnson then became President.' 
Johnson immediately had to decide what to do about the eleven former 
Confederate states." Loyalists in four of these states—Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia—had already formed new 
governments, and President Johnson recognized them as legitimate.' The 
other seven state governments—in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas—had either 
collapsed entirely or were not recognized as legitimate.127 
During the summer of 1865, President Johnson issued Presidential 
Proclamations directing the occupying Union military authorities to hold 
conventions in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Texas for the purpose of amending the state 
119 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several 
states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term 
of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons."). 
120 Id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
121 Id. 
122 See STEPHANIE FITZGERALD, A CIVIL WAR TIMELINE 42 (2014). 
123 See id. at 43. 
124 See id. 
125 See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at vii. 
129 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 17. 
127 See id. 
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constitutions and forming a new government!' He cited the Guarantee 
Clause in Article IV of the Constitution as authority for this action!' By 
December 1865, all of the states that previously had joined the 
Confederacy, except Texas, had established new governments!" 
These reconstructed states desired to send representatives to Congress 
but northern politicians objected for two reasons. First, President 
Johnson's reconstruction efforts were flawed in an important way. His 
proclamations limited participation in the state constitutional conventions 
to those who were eligible to vote before the rebellion, and this restriction 
automatically excluded former slaves.' Meanwhile, President Johnson's 
proclamations allowed all but a small category of high level former 
confederates and confederate supporters to vote so long as they took an 
oath of loyalty. t32 
 The result was that the newly reconstructed states were 
mostly formed and led by former Confederates.133 The proper solution 
would have been to allow former slaves to vote. But this alternative would 
have been very controversial-and even hypocritical-because at the time 
only six northern states allowed non-whites to vote!' 
Second, Congress was worried about the number of representatives 
that the Southern States would send to the House of Representatives. 
Because slavery no longer existed, the Three-Fifths compromise would no 
longer limit the population of any state for determining representation in 
128 See Proclamation No. 38, 13 Stat. 760 (May 29, 1865) (reorganizing North Carolina); 
Proclamation No. 39, 13 Stat. 761 (June 13, 1865) (reorganizing Mississippi); Proclamation No. 41, 
13 Stat. 764 (June 17, 1865) (reorganizing Georgia); Proclamation No. 42,13 Stat. 765 (June 17, 1865) 
(reorganizing Texas); Proclamation No. 43, 13 Stat. 767 (June 21, 1865) (reorganizing Alabama); 
Proclamation No. 46, 13 Stat. 769 (June 30, 1865) (reorganizing South Carolina); Proclamation No. 
47, 13 Stat. 771 (July 13, 1865) (reorganizing Florida). 
129 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 38, 13 Stat. 760 (May 29, 1865) ("Whereas the fourth section of 
the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States declares that the United States shall guarantee 
to every State in the Union a representative form of government . ."); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, 
and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the 
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."). 
130 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 17. President Johnson did not recognize Texas as having 
properly created a new state government until August 1866. Proclamation No. 4, 14 Stat. 814, 817 
(Aug. 20, 1866). 
131 
 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 39, 13 Stat. 761, 762 (June 13, 1865) NNE, person shall be 
qualified as an elector, or shall be eligible as a member of such convention, unless he shall have 
previously taken and subscribed the oath of amnesty, as set forth in the President's Proclamation of 
May 29, A. D. 1865, and is a voter qualified as prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State of 
Mississippi in force immediately before the ninth (9th) of January, A. D. 1861, the date of the so-
called ordinance of secession ... ."). 
132 See, e.g., id. (requiring electors to take a loyalty oath); Proclamation No. 37, 13 Stat. 758, 
75& 59 (May 29, 1865) (excluding fourteen categories of former Confederates from taking the loyalty 
oath, including civil or diplomatic agents of the Confederate government, Confederate military 
officers above the rank of colonel, Confederate governors, and so forth). 
133 See REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, at x. 
134 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 156--57 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that, at the time, former slaves could only vote in Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York, and that referenda that would have 
enfranchised former slaves had been defeated in Connecticut, Wisconsin, the Territory of Colorado, 
and the District of Columbia), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XXVI. 
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Congress. Accordingly, the Southern states would receive more 
representation in Congress because all of the former slaves would count 
as one person rather than three-fifths of a person. One estimate was that 
the South would have at least fifteen more members.' In a statement on 
January 24, 1866, Representative Burton C. Cook explained why this 
result was ironic and undesirable!' He noted that, under the Three-Fifths 
Compromise, "the white people in certain States were [already] granted an 
unequal and disproportionate number of Representatives upon this floor 
because they were the owners of slaves, so that in those States each voter 
had a greater power and influence in the Government than any voter in any 
free State."' Elimination of the Three-Fifths Compromise without giving 
former slaves the right to vote would make the situation worse: "But by 
the fact that slavery is dead this inequality of representation is increased; . 
. . the number would be increased two fifths, the three fifths of a person 
has become a whole person."' Representative Burton concluded with this 
characterization of the practical result of the elimination of the Three-
Fifths Compromise: "The reward of treason will be an increased 
representation in this House, an increased influence in the Government to 
the traitors who have sworn and striven to destroy It."139 
The issue of representation came to a head when the 39th Congress 
convened for its first session from December 4, 1865, to July 28, 1866.140 
Some of the newly reconstructed states attempted to send Senators and 
Representatives to Washington, but Congress refused to allow them to 
participate. Their exclusion took place in a dramatic manner On the 
opening day of the first session, when the clerks of the House and Senate 
took roll, members from these Southern states were present but the clerks 
simply did not call their names."' For example, Horace Maynard, who had 
always been loyal to the United States and who had been elected as a 
member of the House of Representatives from Tennessee,'" was present 
but his name was not called!' He attempted to object but he was not 
allowed to speak.' Representative James Brooks of New York then 
135 See id. at 157 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("While predictions of the precise effect of the change 
varied with the person doing the calculating, the consensus was that the South would be entitled to at 
least 15 new members of Congress, and, of course, a like number of new presidential electors."). 
136 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 410 (statement of Rep. Burton C. Cook). 
137 Id.  
"5 Id. 
139 Id. For a table showing the projected increases state by state, see id. at app. 118. 
1411 The 39th Congress, which had been elected in the fall of 1864, convened for a special one-
week session from March 4 through March 11, 1865. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Special 
Sess.I424 (indicating that Congress convened for a special session). However, the "first session" of 
this Congress did not begin until December 4, 1865. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1 (indicating 
that Congress convened its first session). 
141 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at I (showing the roll call of Senators, which did not include 
any from former Confederate states); id. at 3 (showing the same for the roll call of House Members). 
142 See ERIC L. MCKJTRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 258 (1988). 
143 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3 (failing to call Rep. Maynard at roll call, and then 
denying him the opportunity to speak). 
'4 See id (interrupting Rep. Maynard as he attempted to speak) 
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objected, arguing that it was "revolutionary" to exclude representatives in 
this manner.'" But his protestations fell on deaf ears.'" 
The final result was that the 39th Congress met, and ultimately 
approved the Fourteenth Amendment, without including any Senators or 
Representatives from the former Confederate States.147 Their presence 
surely would have affected the entire process. If at times Congress appears 
to have acted in haste during the spring of 1866, a likely explanation is 
that the Northern Senators and Representatives recognized that they had 
only a limited window of opportunity to approve provisions that Southern 
delegations might block when they reentered Congress. 
C. Eligibility of Former Confederates to Hold Office 
Congress was also concerned about the participation of former rebels 
in politics. For this reason, section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
concerns the eligibility of former Confederates to hold federal or state 
government offices.'" The section disqualifies anyone who both 
previously (1) took an oath to support the Constitution as a significant 
federal or state government official, and (2) then engaged in rebellion.'49  
The first sentence says: 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United 
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof.'5°  
Congress, however, recognized the possible need for exceptions. 
Accordingly, the second sentence of section 3 says: "But Congress may 
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability."' 
This provision requires a little background to understand. Having just 
won the Civil War and defeated the Confederacy, Congress was concerned 
that former leaders of the Confederacy would take over the state and 
federal offices. Congress rejected the approach, favored by President 
Johnson in his proclamations, of excluding only high level Confederate 
145 Id. 
See id. (failing to respond to Rep. Brooks' objection). 
See id. at 3149 (voting to pass the Fourteenth Amendment in both houses of Congress). 
I" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. 
149 Id.  
"" Id. 
151 Id. 
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officials.152 Instead, it focused on those who had sworn to uphold the 
Constitution and then violated that oath." 
D. Confederate Debts 
In addition to the foregoing issues, Congress was also concerned about 
payment of Union and Confederate debts. The first sentence of section 4 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides assurance that the federal 
government will honor its own obligations, saying: 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of 
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.' 
The second sentence, however, prohibits both the federal government and 
the state governments from paying Confederate debts or paying for 
emancipated slaves: 
But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or 
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss 
or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall be held illegal and void.' 
These two provisions arose because of the great cost of the Civil War 
to both sides of the conflict. The North and South each borrowed huge 
sums, at home and abroad, to finance their military operations. The public 
debt of the United States in 1860 was $64.8 million; at the end of 1865, it 
was $2.2 billion.' Jefferson Davis estimated that the Confederate debt in 
late 1864 was more than $1.1 billion.' Senator Howard, however, 
thought that the amount was much larger and that any attempt to pay it 
would invite all manner of claimants to emerge. 1" He said: 
The amount of that debt is probably not less than five billion 
dollars. We do not know its exact amount, and I am not sure 
that it is possible ever to ascertain it; but if there should ever 
be a fair prospect of its assumption by the United States or 
by the States it is perfectly certain that the evidences of it 
152 See Proclamation No. 37, 13 Stat. 758, 758-59 (May 29, 1865) (excluding only fourteen 
categories of former Confederates from taking the loyalty oath, including civil or diplomatic agents of 
the Confederate government, Confederate military officers above the rank of colonel, Confederate 
governors, and so forth). 
153 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3 (rendering ineligible for public service any person who 
violated a prior oath of office by participating in the rebellion). 
' 54 Id. § 4. 
155 Id. 
156 Historical 	 Debt 	 Outstanding, 	 The 	 19th 	 Century, 	 ThEA' SURYDIRECT, 
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt_19cent.htm [https://perma.cc/KE44 
-F2Q2] (last visited Jan. 25, 2017). 
157 JEFFERSON DAVIS, 1 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 493 (1881). 
158 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2768 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard). 
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would multiply . .15° 
Congress believed that the federal government should not disavow the 
Union debt because the debt was legitimate, and defaulting on the debt 
might make future borrowing difficult and more expensive. But Congress 
felt that neither the federal government nor any of the former Confederate 
states should repay the Confederate debts; these debts were huge and 
illegitimate, the former Confederate states were penniless, and repudiating 
the debts should dissuade anyone from making loans to future rebels. 
Section 4 embodies these principles. Representative Thaddeus Stevens 
thought that the provision was so obviously just that it did not even require 
discussion.' 6° 
The position of many southerners was different. Many southerners 
held Confederate notes that had been issued as currency. Others had 
bought confederate bonds. Still others had performed contracts or worked 
for the Confederate government and had not received payment. Southern 
creditors felt that it was unfair to deny them payment and then to force 
them to rejoin the Union and be responsible—along with everyone else—
for paying the Union debts. This thinking may seem unrealistic for the 
losers of a war to hold, but it is often the case that a defeated enemy does 
not pay the victor's costs.' 
The Joint Committee heard numerous witnesses testify that the feeling 
in the South was that the federal government should either assume both 
the Union and Confederate debts or repudiate both of them. For example, 
Senator Howard asked John Hawkshurst, a union loyalist from Virginia, 
what Virginians thought about the state's debt: 
Question. Suppose they cannot repudiate it; what then would 
they do; would they then ask to have their own debt assumed 
by the United States government? 
Answer. Yes; I think there is a strong feeling that their own 
obligations should be paid as well as ours; I think, however, 
there is a strong feeling in favor of repudiation of the whole; 
but failing in that, would endeavor to throw in their own.' 62 
Others made similar comments. One witness explained that a prevailing 
view was "if they [are] going now to [re]establish the Union they should 
repudiate both debts or pay both debts."163 Congress, however, ultimately 
decided that the Union debts should be paid and the Confederate debts 
`" Id. 
See id. at 3148 (allocating only one short sentence to section 4 before moving on). 
161 
 For example, the United States decided not to insist on financial reparations from Japan after 
World War II based on "strategic considerations in the context of the Cold War and the growing 
concern of the United States to prevent a course of action which would have required it to in effect 
finance Japanese reparation payments to third states." Rudolf Dolzer, The Settlement of War-Related 
Claims: Does International Law Recognize a Victim's Private Right of Action? Lessons After 1945, 
20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 296, 312 (2002). 
162 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 51, pt. II, at 21. 
163 1d. at 62. 
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should not be paid. 
Another question before Congress was whether the federal 
government would pay compensation to the former owners of 
emancipated slaves. As discussed below, several proposed constitutional 
amendments concerned this question.' In the end, Congress addressed 
this point in section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
E. Congress 's Limited Powers 
Finally, Congress was concerned about its legislative power. Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."' As 
noted above, President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on 
grounds that Congress lacked the power to enact the provision. In his veto 
message, President Johnson explained: "[A]s to the States no . . . provision 
exists vesting in Congress the power 'to make rules and regulations' for 
them.' Although Congress overrode President Johnson's veto, Congress 
knew that without an express grant of power, a constitutional objection 
might arise to any future civil rights legislation that it wanted to enact. 
Under the Tenth Amendment and the structure of the Constitution, 
Congress is a legislature of limited powers.167 Nothing in the Constitution 
expressly gives Congress the power to enforce either the Bill of Rights or 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article N. Accordingly, Senator 
Howard said section 5 was "indispensable" because "[w]ithout this clause, 
no power is granted to Congress by the amendment or any one of its 
sections" to protect civil rights.' Representative Bingham said that "it 
has been the want of the Republic that there was not an express grant of 
power in the Constitution to enable the whole people of every State, by 
congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements of 
the Constitution."' In addition, Congress had already added a similar 
clause to the Thirteenth Amendment granting power to enforce the 
prohibition on slavery.' That precedent made adding section 5 to the 
Fourteenth Amendment a logical step. 
III. PROPOSED JOINT RESOLUTIONS FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
In the first session of the 39th Congress, members of the House and 
Senate introduced numerous proposals for constitutional amendments. 
164 Infra Section IRA. 
165 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
166 Veto Messages, supra note 102, at 3606. 
167 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."); Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited 
1" CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2768. 
169 Id. at 1034. 
'7° See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation."). 
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Congress designated each proposal as a House or Senate joint resolution, 
and assigned it a number. For example, as described below, one proposal 
for amending the Constitution to prohibit payment of Confederate debts 
was House Joint Resolution No. 9171 (abbreviated as "H. R. No. 9" in the 
Congressional Globe,' and as "H. Res. 9" in the House Journal173). 
Ordinarily, joint resolutions require the approval of a majority of the 
House and Senate and the signature of the President.' But by their 
express terms, H.R. Res. 9 and the other joint resolutions proposing 
constitutional amendments required the concurrence of two-thirds of both 
the House and Senate and approval by three-quarters of the state 
legislatures (but not the signature of the President)." These approval 
requirements satisfy the standards in Article V for amending the 
Constitution.'  
Some of the proposals for constitutional amendments during the first 
session of the 39th Congress addressed Congress's concerns about 
citizenship, civil rights, representation of former Confederate States in 
Congress, the eligibility of former Confederate leaders to hold office, 
payment of Union and Confederate debts, and the powers of Congress. As 
described below, the most important of these joint resolutions were H.R. 
Res. 9, H.R. Res. 51, H.R. Res. 63, and H.R. Res. 127. Of these measures, 
only H.R. Res. 127 achieved the support of two-thirds of the House and 
the Senate; it ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment. The other 
joint resolutions, however, are important because they may provide clues 
about the meaning that Congress attached to H.R. Res. 127. 
A. H.R. Res. 9 (Confederate Debts) 
As described above, a major concern of Congress in 1866 was the 
extensive debts incurred by the Confederate State governments. Congress 
thought that it had no duty to repay these debts and did not want the newly 
reformed governments of the former Confederate states to pay them either. 
Congress ultimately addressed this issue by approving H.R. Res. 127, 
which included what is now section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 
But H.R. Res. 127 was not the first proposal that Congress considered for 
amending the Constitution to address Confederate debts. On the contrary, 
' 7' See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84 (proposing House Joint Resolution No. 9 as an 
amendment to the Constitution). 
172 See, e.g., id. at 88 (abbreviating House Joint Resolution No. 9 as "H. R. No. 9"). 
173 See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 92 (abbreviating House Joint Resolution No. 9 as "H. 
Res. 9"). 
74 Joint Resolution, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.govireference/glossary term/joint resol 
ution.htm [https://perma.ce/BT3J-BTL3]  (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
17' H.R. Res. 9, for example, started by saying: "Be it resolved by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, (two thirds of both Houses concurring,) 
That the following article be proposed . . as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
which, when ratified by three fourths of [state] Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes 
as part of said Constitution, namely ...." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84. 
Thus. CONST. art. V. 
177 Id amend. XIV, § 4. 
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on December 6, 1865, Representative Farnsworth introduced a joint 
resolution, H.R. Res. 9, a proposal on the subject which the House referred 
to its Committee on the Judiciary.' The Committee studied the matter, 
and reported back with a slight revision on December 19, 1865.179 As 
revised, H.R. Res. 9 proposed an amendment to the Constitution that 
would read as follows: 
No tax, duty, or impost shall be laid, nor shall any 
appropriation of money be made, by either the United States, 
or any one of the States thereof, for the purpose of paying, 
either in whole or in part, any debt, contract, or liability 
whatsoever, incurred, made, or suffered by any one or more 
of the States, or the people thereof, for the purpose of aiding 
rebellion against the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.'" 
Representative Wilson explained that this proposed Amendment had 
just one purpose, which was that "no part of the people, either in the North 
or the South, shall be called upon in the future to pay one dollar of the debt 
. . . contracted for the purpose of destroying the Government of the United 
States."' The House debated the proposal the same day and then easily 
approved it, without changes, by well more than the required two-thirds 
margin (150 yeas, 11 nays, and 21 not voting). 182 The Senate learned of 
the House's approval of the proposed joint resolution on December 20, 
1865.183  Despite the extraordinarily speedy passage of the measure in the 
House, the Senate never debated H.R. Res. 9, and it was removed from the 
Senate's calendar on June 20, 1866.184 
In addition to H.R. Res. 9, members of the House and Senate proposed 
but did not approve several other joint resolutions proposed as 
constitutional amendments addressing the payment of Confederate debts 
and paying for the emancipation of slaves: S. Res. 9,185 S. Res. 10,186 S. 
Res. 24,187 S. Res. 62,188 S. Res. 76,189 and H.R. Res. 43.1' Members of 
the House and Senate said little about these measures and they did not 
178 See H. JOURNAL, supra note 67, at 36. 
179 See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84. On December 13, 1865, Senator Stewart had 
introduced a similar proposal for a constitutional amendment into the Senate as S. Res. 5. Id at 35. 
The Senate took no action on this proposal. Id. at 3276--77. 
80 Id at 84. 
181 Id at 86 (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson). 
1" Id at 84-87. 
87 Id. at 88. 
1" Id at 3276-77. 
in S. Res. 9 was introduced on January 5, 1866. Id at 129. The Senate postponed consideration 
of S. Res. 9 indefinitely on June 20, 1866. Id. at 3276. 
186 Id. at 129, 3276. 
187 Id at 391, 701 -02. 
Id at 1906. 
1" Id. at 2233. 
90 Id at 1605. H.R. Res. 43 was introduced on March 13, 1866, and referred to the Joint 
Committee. Id at 1367. An attempt to bring it up for discussion on March 27, 1866 failed. Id. at 1695. 
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come to a vote. Although none of these proposed measures became part of 
the Constitution, contrasting them to H.R. Res. 127 may provide clues as 
to the meaning of section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 ' 
B. H.R. Res. 51 (Representation in Congress) 
Another issue that concerned Congress, as described above, was the 
representation of the former Confederate states in Congress. Congress 
ultimately addressed this issue in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as set forth in H.R. Res. 127. But H.R. Res. 127 was not the first joint 
resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to tackle the subject. 
On December 5, 1865, Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced a 
joint resolution to the Constitution that would make a state's 
representation depend on the number of eligible voters in the state.' The 
House immediately referred this unnumbered proposal to the Committee 
on the Judiciary.193 On January 8, 1866, the House met as a committee of 
the whole and informally discussed the problem of representation.'" 
During this session, Representative Blaine of Maine proposed an 
amendment to Article 1, section 2, clause 3, which excludes from a state's 
population "those to whom civil or political rights or privileges are denied 
or abridged by the constitution or laws of any State on account of race or 
color."195 He predicted that the amendment would "secure the right of 
suffrage to the colored population throughout the South in a very few 
years."196 Otherwise, the states would lose representation; they could not 
even count African-Americans as three-fifths of a person for determining 
their populations. The House, later that day, referred this proposal to the 
Joint Committee.' The House again discussed the issue of the basis of 
representation on January 22-26, and 29-30.198 
On January 9 and 12, the Joint Committee considered possible ways 
to address the issue of representation, and settled on proposing the 
following text: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed: Provided, 
That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or 
abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons 
191 See infra Section IV for a discussion about how courts and scholars have attempted to discern 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, in part by contrasting H.R. Res. 127 with earlier joint 
resolutions that failed to obtain sufficient support. 
192 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 10. 
' 93 Id. 
194 1d. at 138-42. 
' 95 /d. at 141 42. 
196 Id 
197 Id. at 136. 
198 See id. at 353-59 (Jan. 22); id. at 376-89 (Jan. 23); id. at 403-12 (Jan. 24); id. at 422-35 (Jan. 
25); id. at 447-60 (Jan. 26); id. at 483 94 (Jan. 29); id. at 508-09 (Jan. 30). 
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therein of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis 
of representation.' 99 
Representative Thaddeus Stevens introduced this proposal into the 
House on January 31 as H.R. Res. 51,200 and made the purpose of the 
proposed amendment abundantly clear: 
If a state abuses the elective franchise and takes it from those 
who are the only loyal people there, the Constitution says to 
such a State, you shall lose power in the halls of the nation, 
and you shall remain where you are, a shriveled and dried-
up nonentity . . . .201 
The same day, after brief debates, the House voted to approve the 
amendment by a two-thirds margin (120 yeas, 46 nays, and 16 not 
voting).202 H.R. Res. 51 then went to the Senate for approval. The Senate 
discussed the proposal on. February 6-9, 14, 16, 21, 23 and March 5, 7-9, 
1866.203 When the Senate voted on March 9, 1866, a majority of the 
Senators approved it but not with the required two-thirds majority (the vote 
was 25 in favor and 22 against)." Accordingly, H.R. Res. 51 did not have 
enough support to become a constitutional amendment.' At least two 
other joint resolutions also addressed representation in Congress, but they 
were not discussed.' 
C. H.R. Res. 63 (Civil Rights and the Powers of Congress) 
As described above,202 Congress had two important concerns about 
civil rights in 1866. One was that the Bill of Rights by itself did not limit 
the actions of state governments and the other was the Congress lacked 
any express power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the states. Congress 
ultimately addressed these concerns in sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.' But before Congress approved H.R. Res. 127, the House 
1" Id at 535. 
zno Id. at 534-535. Senator Fessenden introduced a similar measure into the Senate on January 
22, 1866, as S. Res. 22. See id. at 337 ("That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or 
abridged in any State on account of race or color all persons of such race or color shall be excluded 
from the basis of representation."). 
201 Id. at 536. 
2" Id. at 535-38. 
2"  See id. at 673-87 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 6); id at 702-08 (discussing H.R. 
Res. 51 on February 7); id. at 736-42 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 8); id. at 763-70 
(discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 9); id. at 831-35 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 14); id 
at 876-86 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 16); id. at 957-65 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on 
February 21); id. at 981-91 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on February 23); id. at 1180-84 (discussing H.R. 
Res. 51 on March 5); id. at 1224-33 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on March 7); id. at 1254-58 (discussing 
H.R. Res. 51 on March 8); id. at 1275-89 (discussing H.R. Res. 51 on March 9). 
204 Id. at 1288-89. 
2' Id. 
Id. at 2264-65 (addressing S. Res. 78 on April 30,1866); id. at 2560 (addressing S. Res. 78 
on May 14, 1866). 
2"  See supra Section 11.B (detailing representation in Congress). 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1,5. 
2017] 	 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
	 1099 
considered another provision, H.R. Res. 63, which had similar objectives. 
H.R. Res. 63 arose in the Joint Committee. On January 12, the Joint 
Committee formed a subcommittee on the powers of Congress.209 On 
January 27, 1866, Representative Bingham reported to the full committee 
that the subcommittee had approved a proposed amendment.21° The 
subcommittee's proposal said: 
Congress shall have power to make laws which shall be 
necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every state 
full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property; 
and to all citizens of the United States in any State the same 
immunities and equal political rights and privileges.2" 
Although the Journal of the Joint Committee does not report the debates 
of the full committee, it does show that the full committee made minor 
amendments to the proposal on both January 27 and February 3.212 On 
February 10, the Committee then voted to send the proposed amendment 
to both Houses of Congress as a proposed constitutional amendment.213 
 
On February 26, Representative Bingham introduced the proposed 
constitutional amendment to the House as a joint resolution, H.R. Res. 
6-.  
.5 214 The proposal, as it had been revised by the full committee, said: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall 
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each 
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States (Art. 4, Sec. 2), and to all persons in the several States 
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property 
(5th Amendment).21 5 
After quoting the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article V and 
the last clause of the Fifth Amendment, Representative Bingham said: 
Sir, it has been the want of the Republic that there was not 
an express grant of power in the Constitution to enable the 
whole people of every State, by congressional enactment, to 
enforce obedience to these requirements of the Constitution. 
Nothing can be plainer to thoughtful men than that if the 
grant of power had been originally conferred upon the 
Congress of the nation, and legislation had been upon your 
statute-books to enforce these requirements of the 
Constitution in every State, that rebellion, which has scarred 
"9  KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 43,46. 
21' Id. at 56. 
211 Id.  
212 See id. at 56-58 (describing the amendments agreed to o n January 27); id. at 60-61 
(describing the amendments agreed to on February 3). 
213 Id. at 62-63. 
214 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1033-34. Senator Fessenden had introduced a very similar 
measure, S.R. 30, on February 13,1866. Id. at 806. 
215 Id. at 1034. 
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and blasted the land, would have been an impossibility.216 
Representative Bingham explained that the proposed amendment would 
solve these problems. He said: "The proposition pending before the House 
is simply a proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the 
consent of the people of the United States, with the power to enforce the 
bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today."' 
The House of Representatives debated H.R. Res. 63 on February 26-
28.218 Despite Representative Bingham's arguments, opponents of the 
proposal strongly objected that it went too far. The Supreme Court 
summarized the opposition to H.R. Res. 63 in City of Boerne v. Flores:219 
[Some argued that the] proposed Amendment gave Congress 
too much legislative power at the expense of the existing 
constitutional structure. Democrats and conservative 
Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment would 
give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of 
state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal 
design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views, 
Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York 
labeled the Amendment "an utter departure from every 
principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our 
Constitution," and warned that under it "all State legislation, 
in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and 
procedure . . . may be overridden, may be repealed or 
abolished, and the law of Congress established instead." 
Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the 
Amendment would permit "Congress to legislate fully upon 
all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property," such that 
"there would not be much left for the State Legislatures," 
and would thereby "work an entire change in our form of 
government." Some radicals, like their brethren "unwilling 
that Congress shall have any such power . . . to establish 
uniform laws throughout the United States upon . . . the 
protection of life, liberty, and property," also objected that 
giving Congress primary responsibility for enforcing legal 
equality would place power in the hands of changing 
congressional majorities.' 
On February 28, 1866, when it appeared that the proposal would not 
gain approval, the House voted to postpone consideration until "the second 
216 Id 
217 Id. at 1088. 
215 See id. at 1033-34 (discussing H.R. Res. 63 on February 26); id. at 1054--67 (discussing H.R. 
Res. 63 on February 27); id. at 1083-95 (discussing H.R. Res. 63 on February 28). 
uv 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
220 Id. at 520-21 (citations omitted). 
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Tuesday in April" (i.e., April 10, 1866).221 The House, however, never 
reopened the subject. On June 6, 1866, Representative Bingham moved 
that H.R. Res. 63 "be indefinitely postponed, for reason that the 
constitutional amendment already passed by the House [i.e., H.R. Res. 
127] covers the whole subject matter."222 The House approved the 
motion.' The Senate never considered H.R. Res. 63. 
D. H.R. Res. 127 (The Fourteenth Amendment) 
After these unsuccessful initial attempts to approve the previously 
discussed joint resolutions proposing amendments to the Constitution, 
Congress finally succeeded with H.R. Res. 127, the provision that became 
the Fourteenth Amendment. H.R. Res. 127 was broader in scope than the 
prior proposals. It addressed all of the subjects of H.R. Res. 9, H.R. Res. 
51, and H.R. Res. 63. It also included a provision on the eligibility of 
former Confederate officials to hold government office. 
On April 21, 1866, Representative Stevens introduced into the Joint 
Committee "a plan of reconstruction, one not of his own framing, but [one] 
which he should support."224 This proposal contained five sections. The 
Committee debated the proposal and, as described below, made various 
revisions before approving it for submission to Congress on April 28, 
1866.225 Representative Stevens introduced the proposal into the House on 
April 30, 1866, as H.R. Res. 127,226 but the House voted to postpone 
discussing the proposal until May 8.227 
 On May 8, Representative Stevens 
gave a long speech in which he explained the meaning and purpose of each 
section.228 The House debated H.R. Res. 127 on May 8, 9, and 10.229 
 On 
May 10, the House voted to approve H.R. Res. 127, without amendment, 
by a two-thirds majority (128 yeas, 37 nays, and 19 not voting).230 
H.R. Res. 127 was introduced into the Senate on May 10, but no 
discussion occurred on that day." On May 23, Senator Howard initiated 
the Senate's consideration of H.R. Res. 127 by analyzing each of its five 
sections.232 The Senate discussed H.R. Res. 127 as a committee of the 
whole on May 23, 24, and 29, in regular sessions on May 30 and 31, and 
221 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1094-95. Immediately before this decision, the House 
rejected a motion to "lay the whole subject on the table," which would have only temporarily delayed 
consideration. Id. 
222 Id. at 2980. 
223 Id. 
224 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 82-83. 
225 See id at 83-116 (documenting revisions to the initial plan). 
226 LONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286. 
227 Id.  
228 See id. at 2459-60 (providing a transcript of the speech made by Representative Stevens). 
229 See id. at 2458-73 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 8); id. at 2498---513 (discussing H.R. 
Res. 127 on May 9); id. at 2530-45 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 10). 
230 Id. at 2545. 
231 Id. at 2530. 
232 See id. at 2764-68 (May 23, 1866) (detailing Senator Howard's explanation of sections I - 5 
of H.R. Res. 127). 
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as a committee of the whole from June 4 to June 8.2" During this time, as 
discussed below, the Senate made various amendments to the proposal. 
On June 8, 1866, the Senate approved the amended version of H.R. Res. 
127 by a two-thirds vote (33 yeas, 11 nays).234 
Because the Senate had approved an amended version of H.R. Res. 
127, the joint resolution had to go back to the House to see if the House 
would concur in the Senate's amendments. The Amended version of H.R. 
Res. 127 was introduced in the House on June 9.235 The House debated the 
amended version on June 13.236 Representative Stevens briefly described 
the Senate's amendments, some of which he approved and some of which 
he disfavored.' The House concurred in the Senate's version by a two-
thirds vote (120 yeas, 32 nays, and 32 not voting).238 
Congress sent the approved version of joint resolution H.R. Res. 127 
to the Secretary of State, for delivery to President Johnson, on June 16.239 
President Andrew Johnson likely opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
Article V assigns no role to the President in the Amendment process. 
Accordingly, President Andrew Johnson's only duty was to send the 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the states, which he did on June 22, 
1866.240 In doing so, he emphasized that this action should "be considered 
as purely ministerial, and in no sense whatever committing the Executive 
to an approval or a recommendation of the amendment to the State 
legislatures or to the people.,/241 
The details of the state ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that there were serious 
irregularities.' But on July 28, 1868, Secretary of State William Seward 
proclaimed that three-fourths of the states had ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment.243  
The following discussion outlines the development of the text of each 
section of H.R. Res. 127 from the initial proposal of April 21 within the 
Joint Committee to the final version approved by the House and Senate. 
233 See id at 2764-71 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 23); id. at 2798-2804 (discussing H.R. 
Res. 127 on May 24); id. at 2868-69 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 29); id. at 2890-02 (discussing 
H.R. Res. 127 on May 30); id. at 2914-21 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on May 31); id at 2938-44 
(discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 4); id. at 2960-65 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 5); id. at 2984-
93 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 6), id. at 3010-11 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 7); id at 
3026-42 (discussing H.R. Res. 127 on June 8). 
234 Id. at 3041-42. 
235 Id at 3055. 
226 /d. at 3144 '19. 
237 Id at 3148. 
235 id at 3149. 
239 Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, No. 48, 
14 Stat. 358 (1866). 
24° 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. JOURNAL 563 (1866). 
241 Id. 
242 See Colby, supra note 16, at 1666. 
243 Proclamation No. 13,15 Stat. 708,709-710 (1868). 
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1. Section 1 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 of the April 21 proposal in the Committee said: "No 
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to 
the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude."' The Committee revised this sentence substantially before 
submitting it to Congress. As introduced in Congress, the proposal said: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 
Two features of the revision in the Committee deserve mention. First, 
as the text shows, the Committee decided to drop all mention of race. 
Professor Earl Maltz has observed that this specific change has had 
sweeping consequences, allowing courts to apply the Equal Protection 
clause to address many forms of discrimination and not just racial 
discrimination.' Second, the revised version sounds very much like H.R. 
Res. 63, but does not say anything about the powers of Congress. 
The House approved H.R. Res. 127 as it was introduced. But the 
Senate added an initial sentence declaring all persons born in the United 
States to be U.S. citizens.' Senator Howard and others discussed the 
purpose, meaning, and limitations of this amendment to the proposal on 
May 30.248 The sentence had the effect of overruling the Supreme Court's 
decision in Dred Scott that persons of African descent could never be 
citizens.' Senator Revardy Johnson, who as an attorney had represented 
John Sanford against Dred Scott before the Supreme Court," supported 
the amendment.' Without discussing his former role in the matter, he 
subtly mentioned that "serious questions have arisen, and some of them 
have given rise to embarrassments, as to who are citizens of the United 
States, and what are the rights which belong to them as such; and the object 
of this amendment is to settle that question."' When the matter came 
before the House, Representative Stevens merely commented: "This is an 
excellent amendment, long needed to settle conflicting decisions between 
244 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 83. 
245 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286. 
246 Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the 
Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 297-98 (2015). 
247 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
248 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2890--95. 
249 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 457 (1856), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
250 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2893; see Dred Scott, 60 'U.S. at 399 (identifying "Mr. 
Johnson"  as counsel for the defendant in error). 
251 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2893. 
252 Id. 
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the several States and the United States."' 
2. Section 2 of the Committee's April 21 Proposal, Which Was 
Deleted by the Committee and Not Included in the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Section 2 of the April 21 proposal would have banned racial 
discrimination with respect to the right to vote. The proposal said: 
From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one 
thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination 
shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to 
the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage, 
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.' 
The Joint Committee, however, deleted the original section 2. Because 
the Journal does not record committee discussions, the reasons for deleting 
this provision are lost to history. Voting discrimination became a subject 
that ultimately would be addressed by the Fifteenth Amendment." 
3. Section 3 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 3 of the April 21 committee proposal addressed representation 
in Congress and was very similar to H.R. Res. 51. It said: 
Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and 
seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right of any of 
whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by any state, 
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
shall be included in the basis of representation.256 
The Committee undertook various changes to this proposal and 
renumbered it to be section 2. As introduced into Congress, the new 
section 2 read as follows: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
whenever in any State the elective franchise shall be denied 
to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one 
years of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation 
253 Id at 3148. 
254 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 83-84. 
255 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude."). That said, it should be noted that Senator Henderson introduced a proposal, 
SR. No. 23, on January 23,1866, that would have amended the Constitution to prohibit discrimination 
in voting: "No State, in prescribing the qualifications requisite for electors therein, shall discriminate 
against any person on account of color or race." CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 362. 
256 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84. 
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in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such 
State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of such male 
citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.257 
 
This language is very similar to the language in H.R. Res. 51, but it is 
more detailed. The House approved the language without change, but the 
Senate revised it. The following marked paragraph shows the difference 
between the initial version of H.R. Res. 127 and the final version approved 
by both Houses (with deleted text stricken and new text underlined): 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
Estates which may be included within this Union according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each Estate, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied 
to any portion of its male citizens not less than when the right 
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President 
 
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in  
Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the 
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the  
male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of 
age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion., or other 
crime, the basis of representation in such State therein  shall 
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of sueit-male citizens 
not less than twenty-one years of age in such state 258 
The changes to the first sentence appear to be purely stylistic, as are 
some of the changes in the second sentence. But the second sentence also 
differs substantively. Senator Williams, who proposed the amendment, 
thought it would be preferable for the section to specify "particularly the 
officers for which these people must be allowed to vote in order to be 
counted."' The Senate discussed the whole issue of representation at 
length on June 8 before approving the amended version.' When the 
Senate's revisions came back to the House for approval, Representative 
Stevens did not object to the changes but expressed disappointment that 
the joint resolution did not go further and ban discrimination in voting (as 
section 2 of the original April 21 proposal would have done).261 
4. A New Section, Which Was Not Included in the April 21 Proposal 
and Which Became Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
President Johnson's proclamations regarding the reconstruction of 
257 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286. 
258 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
259 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 3029. 
260 See id. at 3026-40. 
261 See id. at 3148. 
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former Confederate states allowed most former Confederate supporters to 
vote so long as they took a loyalty oath. The constitutional amendments 
proposed in H.R. Res. 9, No. 51, and No. 63 did not address this issue of 
former Confederate officials. The initial April 21 proposal in the Joint 
Committee also contained no provision on the subject. But the issue arose 
again after the Joint Committee deleted the original section 2, and 
renumbered the original section 3 to be section 2. On April 28, 
Representative Williams proposed the following new provision, which 
became section 3 of the Committee's proposal when it was introduced into 
the House: 
Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons who 
voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and 
comfort, shall be excluded from the right to vote for 
Representatives in Congress and for electors for President 
and Vice-President of the United States.262 
The House did not make any changes to this provision when it passed 
H.R. Res. 127. The Senate, however, approved a substantial revision of it 
to say: 
That no person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold 
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under 
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State Legislature, or as an executive 
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of 
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two thirds 
of each House, remove such disability.263  
This modification switched the focus from voting to limiting the 
ability to serve in state or federal office. The new language was proposed 
on May 30,264 and discussed the same day.265 Senator Johnson thought that 
it was better than the committee's original proposal of disenfranchisement. 
He said: 
I am opposed to the amendment as proposed by the 
committee . . . . All history shows, as I think, that on the 
conclusion of a civil war, the more mild . . . the measures are 
which are adopted the better for the restoration of entire 
peace and harmony.266  
262 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 116. 
263 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2897. 
264 Id. 
265 Id at 2897 2902. 
266 1d. at 2898. 
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He complained that the committee's original proposal would 
disenfranchise "nine tenths, perhaps, of the gentlemen of the South."267 
When the revision came back to the House, Representative Stevens 
said: "This I cannot look upon as an improvement. It opens the elective 
franchise to such as the States choose to admit. In my judgment, it 
endangers the Government."5268 Despite his reservations, he still urged the 
House to approved H.R. Res. 127 as modified by the Senate. "[L]et us no 
longer delay; take what we can get now," he said, "and hope for better 
things in future legislation."269 
5. Section 4 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 4 of the original April 21 proposal resembled H.R. Res. 9. It 
concerned payment of Confederate debts and payments for the 
emancipation of slaves. It said that "[d]ebts incurred in aid of insurrection 
or of war against the Union, and claims of compensation for loss of 
involuntary service or labor, shall not be paid by any state nor by the 
United States."' The committee modified the language before sending 
this version to Congress as section 4 of H.R. Res. 127: 
Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation already incurred, or which may 
hereafter be incurred, in aid of insurrection or of war against 
the United States, or any claim for compensation for loss of 
involuntary service or labor. 271 
 
The House passed this version without making any changes. The 
Senate discussed section 4 at length on June 4.272 That same day, Senator 
Howard suggested revisions, which included changing the last clause to 
read "any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void."273 The 
debates contain little explanation for these minor revisions. When the 
matter returned to the House, Representative Stevens had no issues with 
the Senate's amendments to section 4.274 
6. Section 5 of the April 21 Proposal, Which Became Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 5 of the April 21 proposal read: "Congress shall have power 
to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."275 This 
section resembled H.R. Res. 63 in that it sought to give additional 
267 m  
2"  Id at 3148. 
269 a 
270 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84. 
271 CoNG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286. 
272 id. at 2938. 
273 Id at 2941. 
274 Id. at 3148. 
275 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 84. 
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legislative power to Congress but was more limited. Rather than granting 
Congress a general power to protect life, liberty, and property, section 5 
provides authority limited to enforcing the provisions of the amendment. 
As the Supreme Court explained in City of Boerne v. Flores,' "[u]nder 
the revised Amendment, Congress' power was no longer plenary [i.e., as 
it would have been under H.R. Res. 63] but remedial. Congress was 
granted the power to make the substantive constitutional prohibitions 
against the States effective."277 
The April 21 proposal made it through the Joint Committee and both 
the Senate and the House with only stylistic changes (adding "The" before 
"Congress" and a comma after "enforce").278 In the House, Representative 
Bingham discussed the protections of the first section and then with 
apparent reference to the fifth section explained that the amendment would 
empower Congress "to protect by national law the privileges and 
immunities of all the citizens of the Republic . . . whenever the same shall 
be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State."' Senator 
Howard said that section 5 "enables Congress, in case the States shall enact 
laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that 
legislation by a formal congressional enactment.',280 
IV. DEFINITIONS OF ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE LIMITED RELEVANCE 
OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
In discussions of the "original meaning" of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the term "original meaning" may refer to at least three 
distinct kinds of meaning. The term "original intent of Congress" (or 
"original intent") typically refers to the meaning that the members of the 
39th Congress collectively intended the Amendment to have. The 
"original understanding of the ratifiers" (or "original understanding"), in 
contrast, is the meaning that the state legislatures actually understood the 
Fourteenth Amendment to have when they approved and ratified the 
Amendment. And the "original objective meaning" (or "original public 
meaning") is the meaning that a reasonable person would have attached to 
the words of the Amendment when the Amendment became effective. 
In some cases, the original intent, the original understanding, and 
original objective meaning are one and the same. For a simple hypothetical 
example, consider section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The last 
sentence of this section says Congress may remove a former Confederate's 
disability from holding office by a vote of two-thirds of "each House." 
Evidence may show that the 39th Congress intended the quoted term to 
refer to the Senate and the House of Representatives, that the state 
legislatures understood the quoted term to have the same meaning, and 
that a reasonable person would also have understood the quoted term in 
276 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
277 Id. at 522. 
278 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
279 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 24, at 2542. 
280 Id. at 2768. 
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the same way. 
But the original intent, the original understanding, and the original 
objective meaning may diverge on particular issues. As another 
hypothetical example, consider the term "privileges or immunities" in 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statements by members of the 
House and Senate may show that Congress intended the quoted term to 
refer to the specific privileges and immunities discussed in Justice 
Bushrod Washington's circuit court opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.' But 
evidence of debates in the state legislatures may show that those 
legislatures actually understood the term to refer only to the privileges or 
immunities identified in the Bill of Rights. And objective evidence 
showing the customary usage of such words might show that a reasonable 
person of the era would have interpreted the term to refer to all privileges 
and immunities secured by federal laws. 
These distinctions are important because when jurists and scholars cite 
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, they are generally 
attempting to discern the original intent of Congress rather than the 
original understanding of the state legislatures or original objective 
meaning. The Congressional Globe, the Journal and Report of the Joint 
Committee, and the House and Senate Journals typically yield clues about 
what members of Congress were thinking in December of 1865 and in the 
spring of 1866. The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment has 
less relevance in establishing the original understanding of the state 
legislatures and the original objective meaning. What appears in the 
Congressional Globe and similar documents is not a record of what state 
legislatures understood the Fourteenth Amendment to mean, and do not 
necessarily show how a reasonable person would have understood the 
Amendment's text. The best evidence of those meanings would come from 
other sources not discussed in this Article. For example, records of the 
debates within the state legislatures might show how the legislatures 
understood the amendment. And dictionaries from the 1860s and similar 
sources might show how a reasonable person would have interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although the distinction among types of original meaning may sound 
academic, the subject is very important when discussing the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The legislative history contains evidence showing that 
Congress attached (or may have attached) meanings to H.R. Res. 127 that 
likely would not have been evident to state legislatures and reasonable 
members of the public. For example, as noted above, Justice Black 
concluded that Congress intended the Due Process Clause to incorporate 
the substantive protections of the Bill of Rights.' Statements by 
281 
 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). This was a decision from the Circuit Court in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania that was decided by Justice Washington while he was riding circuit. Id at 
551-52. 
282 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled in part, 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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Representative Bingham and others may support this view. But these 
statements at best help to prove the original intent. They do not show the 
original understanding of the state legislatures or original objective 
meaning of the words "due process."283 
Eminent writers have taken different views on which type of original 
meaning of the Constitution is most important.'" Resolution of this 
interesting debate is beyond the scope of this Article. Regardless of whose 
view on the subject is best supported, writers who rely on the legislative 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment to make claims about the 
Amendment's original meaning should recognize that their arguments are 
primarily about the original intent of Congress. The legislative documents 
show what members of Congress wanted the Amendment to mean. 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is not 
irrelevant in determining the original objective meaning of its text. The 
numerous Congressional documents provide what has been called 
"publicly available context of constitutional communication." They 
show how people in 1866 talked about the subjects covered by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Thomas's opinion in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago provides an example. Justice Thomas began his discussion of the 
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities clause with this 
statement: "When interpreting constitutional text, the goal is to discern the 
most likely public understanding of a particular provision at the time it 
was adopted."286  Justice Thomas then had to explain how citing statements 
from the legislative history could help to show this objective meaning. His 
nuanced argument shows that, while such statements may not always 
provide strong evidence of the original public meaning, they might have 
relevance in some circumstances. Justice Thomas wrote: 
Statements by legislators can assist in this process [i.e., the 
process of discerning the original public meaning] to the 
extent they demonstrate the manner in which the public used 
or understood a particular word or phrase. They can further 
'Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original 
Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 362-65 (2009) 
(discussing how the intent of the Congress may not correspond to the original public meaning). 
284  Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, generally looked to the original intent of the 
Framers of constitutional provisions in his opinions. See Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning 
of the Constitution Matters to Justice Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 499 (2009). James 
Madison, on the other hand, said that the original understanding of the ratifiers was more important. 
Id. at 501--02. Justice Antonin Scalia asserted that courts should focus on the original objective 
meaning. Id. at 502. And more recently Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have been 
influential in arguing that courts should interpret the constitution according to the "original methods" 
by which courts interpreted at the time of the Framing. John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, 
Interpreting the Constitution Through Original Methods Originalism, VoLoicu CONSPIRACY (Jan. 8, 
2014, 9:00 AM), http://volokh.com/2014/01/08/interpreting-constitution-original-methods-
originalism/ [https://perma.cc/DMC2-FDHJ].  
285 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 
1939 (2013). 
286 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 828 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
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assist to the extent there is evidence that these statements 
were disseminated to the public. In other words, this 
evidence is useful not because it demonstrates what the 
draftsmen of the text may have been thinking, but only 
insofar as it illuminates what the public understood the 
words chosen by the draftsmen to mean.287 
The key in making this kind of argument is showing strong reasons 
for believing that the public knew what transpired. For example, after 
Justice Thomas cited a floor speech by John Bingham, he explained: 
That speech was printed in pamphlet form, see Speech of 
Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio, on the Civil Rights Bill, 
Mar. 9, 1866 (CONG. GLOBE); see 39th CONG. GLOBE 1837 
(remarks of Rep. Lawrence) (noting that the speech was 
"extensively published"), and the New York Times covered 
the speech on its front page. Thirty—Ninth Congress, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 10, 1866, p. 1.288 
And when Justice Thomas cited a floor speech by Senator Howard, he 
noted: "News of Howard's speech was carried in major newspapers across 
the country, including the New York Herald, see N.Y. Herald, May 24, 
1866, p. 1, which was the best-selling paper in the Nation at that time."289 
 
When this kind of evidence can supplement the legislative history, and 
show that it may have influenced state legislators or public debate, claims 
about the original objective meaning or original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are stronger. 
An earlier example of using legislative history to determine the 
original objective meaning appears in United States v. Wong Kim Ark.29° 
In that case, the Court considered whether a child born in the United States, 
of parents of Chinese descent, is a citizen under the first sentence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' The Court considered statements by members 
of Congress on the issue and concluded that they believed that such 
children would be citizens.' The Court then addressed the distinction 
between the original objective meaning and the original intent of Congress 
as follows: 
Doubtless, the intention of the congress which framed, and 
of the states which adopted, this amendment of the 
constitution, must be sought in the words of the amendment, 
and the debates in congress are not admissible as evidence 
to control the meaning of those words. But the statements 
above quoted are valuable as contemporaneous opinions of 
287 Id. at 828-29. 
2" Id. at 831. 
2"  Id at 832. 
290 169 U.S. 649, 653 (1898). 
291 Id. at 699. 
292 Id at 674-75. 
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jurists and statesmen upon the legal meaning of the words 
themselves, and arc, at the least, interesting as showing that 
the application of the amendment to the Chinese race was 
considered and not overlooked.' 
In other words, the Court believed that Citizenship Clause should be 
interpreted according to its original objective meaning. It cited statements 
by members of Congress not to discern their subjective intentions, but 
instead to determine the legal meaning of the words as "jurists and 
statesmen" would have interpreted them at the time. 
V. TYPICAL METHODS OF USING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO MAKE CLAIMS ABOUT ITS ORIGINAL 
MEANING 
Describing all of the different ways that jurists and scholars might use 
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to make claims about 
the Amendment's original meaning would be impossible. The ingenuity 
of the legal mind in devising arguments from such documentary evidence 
is limitless. But a summary of the most common approaches may be 
helpful. The following discussion addresses five typical ways of basing 
claims about the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning on its 
legislative history. Each section below describes a method, gives examples 
of its use, analyzes strengths and weaknesses of the method, and suggests 
practices that writers can use to make their claims employing that method 
more persuasive. 
A. Express Explanations 
Jurists and scholars most commonly base claims about the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment on express explanations of H.R. 
Res. 127 that appear in the legislative history. The theory behind this 
approach, generally unstated, is that members of Congress heard, 
understood, and accepted these explanations about the meaning of H.R. 
Res. 127. And when they voted to approve H.R. Res. 127, they intended 
the language to have the same meaning. 
An example of this method of making a claim about the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment appears in Justice Powell's 
concurring opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick.' That case concerned the 
scope of Congress's power under section 5 to enact a law that set aside 
10% of certain funding for minority-owned businesses.' Section 5 
provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article."296 Justice Powell concluded 
from numerous statements by Representative Stevens, Senator Howard, 
293 Id. at 699. 
294 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). 
295 Id. at 453 (plurality opinion). 
296 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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and others that Congress could use this power "to select reasonable 
remedies" for "repairing the effects of discrimination."297 Justice Powell 
cited statements in which speakers explained how Congress had discretion 
in exercising its powers under section 5. Senator Howard and Senator 
Poland, for instance, both described section 5 as giving Congress the 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's "principles," and 
Representative Stevens described section 5 as granting a power "to correct 
the unjust legislation of the States."298 
Researchers can find express statements about the meaning of H.R. 
Res. 127 in the Congressional Globe in nearly every discussion of H.R. 
Res. 127 from May 10, when it was introduced into the House, until June 
8, when the House approved the Senate's amendments. Additional 
statements about H.R. Res. 127 appear in the appendix to Volume 36. 
Unfortunately, as noted above, the Journal of the Joint Committee contains 
no express statements by members of the Committee in committee 
meetings about the meaning of the various provisions of H.R. Res. 127. 
As explained above, the Journal records only official actions, such as 
proposals, amendments, and votes, and does not preserve internal 
committee debates. 
The most commonly cited explanations of H.R. Res. 127 are found in 
four passages: (1) Representative Stevens's section-by-section 
introduction of H.R. Res. 127 to the House on May 8, 1866;2" (2) Senator 
John Howard's section-by-section introduction of H.R. Res. 127 to the 
Senate on May 23, 1866;3" (3) the Senate's discussion of proposed 
amendments to H.R. Res. 127 on May 30, 1866;30' and (4) Representative 
Stevens's explanation to the House on June 13, 1866, of the Senate's 
amendments to H.R. Res. 127.302 Although researchers should not limit 
themselves to these passages, they provide an excellent starting point for 
discovering what Congress intended H.R. Res. 127 to mean. 
Claims about Congress's intent in enacting the Fourteenth 
Amendment that rely on a statement made during the debates over H.R. 
Res. 127 often are subject to a straightforward objection: Just because a 
Senator or Representative said something when debating the resolution 
that became the Fourteenth Amendment does not mean that everyone 
agreed with it. The statement may have been a unanimous view, a majority 
view, a minority view, or even the view only of the speaker. 
Writers can respond to this potential basis for impeaching claims that 
rely on express explanations in three basic ways. First, writers can look for 
additional supporting evidence in the legislative history. The more 
statements made in support of a position, the more likely it was to hold a 
297 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 508--10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
298 See id at 508-09 (quoting remarks from Sen. Howard, Sen. Poland, and Rep. Stevens in the 
CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE). 
299 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2459-60. 
300 1d. at 2764-67. 
3' Id. at 2890-2902. 
302 See id. at 3148 (June 13, 1866). 
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majority view. 
Second, writers can look to see if any member of Congress objected 
to the explanation upon which they are relying. A lack of objection may 
suggest general agreement. For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,' the 
Supreme Court considered the question whether Congress could restrict 
literacy tests for voting using its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.' The New York state attorney general argued that Congress 
did not have this power because a court had not determined that the state 
literacy test violated the Equal Protection Clause.305 But the Court rejected 
this interpretation of section 5. It relied on Senator Howard's statement 
that section 5 'casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for 
the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good 
faith.''306  Sensitive to the possible concern about whether other members 
of Congress agreed with Senator Howard on this point, the Court 
remarked, "This statement of § 5's purpose [by Senator Howard] was not 
questioned by anyone in the course of the debate."' Justice Thomas used 
similar reasoning in construing the Privileges or Immunities Clause. After 
quoting statements indicating that the phrase referred to what Justice 
Washington had said in Corfield v. Coryell,308 he added "no Member of 
Congress refuted the notion that Washington's analysis in Corfield 
undergirded the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause."' To be 
sure, a lack of express objection to a statement does not necessarily mean 
that everyone agreed. But it does add weight. 
Third, when both supporters and opponents of a proposed legislative 
measure make statements about the meaning of a proposition, writers 
might argue that the statements of the supporters of the Amendment should 
have more weight than the comments of opponents. This proposition rests 
on the idea that, even if we cannot know for sure which arguments 
persuaded the legislature, it was more likely to be the arguments of the 
supporters because they represented the majority. 
B. Comparison of Drafts 
Writers also make claims about what Congress originally intended the 
Fourteenth Amendment to mean based on comparisons of H.R. Res. 127 
to H.R. Res. 9, No. 51, or No. 63 or based on comparisons of the final 
version of H.R. Res. 127 to prior versions of H.R. Res. 127. The theory 
behind this method is that a comparison of texts can yield context for 
making inferences about meanings that Congress intended. 
An example of comparing H.R. Res. 127 to another proposal for 
303 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
'4 Id. at 643 47. 
See id. at 648. 
Id. at 648-49 n.8 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2768). 
307 Id. at 648 n.8. 
308 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 526 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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amending the Constitution appears in City of Boerne v. Flores. At issue 
was how to interpret section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court compared H.R. Res. 63 to section 5 of H.R. Res. 127. As 
described above, H.R. Res. 63 would have given Congress plenary power 
"to make laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to all persons 
in every state full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and 
property."31° Congress did not approve H.R. Res. 63, but did approve H.R. 
Res. 127, which gave Congress only the power "to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article." 311 An inference from comparing 
the two drafts is that Congress did not intend the Fourteenth Amendment 
to have the broader plenary power that H.R. Res. 63 would have provided. 
As the Court put it: "Under the revised Amendment, Congress' power was 
no longer plenary but remedial."' 
An example of comparing the final version of H.R. Res. 127 to an 
earlier draft of H.R. Res. 127 appears in Davidson v. New Orleans.313  The 
issue in that case was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires a state government to pay just compensation when it 
takes private property. Contrary to modern decisions, the Court inferred 
that Congress had not intended a just compensation requirement.' The 
Court relied on evidence that the Joint Committee considered but rejected 
a proposal by Representative Bingham to amend section 1 to include a just 
compensation requirement.' The Court said, "Mt must be remembered 
that, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the provision on that 
subject (just compensation), in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth 
amendment with the one we are now construing (due process), was left 
out, and this (due process) was taken."' Years later, in dicta in Adamson 
v. California,317 Justice Black drew a different conclusion from the 
evidence. He concluded that Representative Bingham's proposed version 
of section 1 was rejected because expressly stating a just compensation 
clause was unnecessary. In his view, the deletion helped confirm "the 
Framers thought that in the language they had included this protection 
along with all the other protections of the Bill of Rights."ms 
This example shows that a comparison of drafts does not always yield 
unambiguous clues about what Congress intended in approving H.R. Res. 
127. Writers therefore should explain their inferences as clearly as 
possible—as the Court did in Davidson and Justice Black did in 
Adamson—and anticipate possible alternative inferences. Given the 
potential for ambiguity, writers also should look for additional bases for 
310 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 56. 
311 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
312 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522 (1997). 
313 96 U.S. 97 (1877). 
314 Id at 105. 
315 KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 85 (Apr. 21, 1866) (rejecting Rep. Bingham's proposal to amend 
section 1 of the proposal that became H.R. Res. 127 by adding the phrase "nor take private property 
for public use without just compensation"). 
316 Davidson, 96 U.S. at 105. 
317 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled in part, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
310 Id. at 80 n.9 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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supporting their claims about the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
C. Evidence of Purpose 
Writers also sometimes base claims about the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on evidence of Congress's purpose in approving 
H.R. Res. 127. The legislative debates contain many statements about the 
goals of Congress in approving H.R. Res. 127. For instance, Senator 
Howard explained that the purpose of the first sentence of section l was 
to eliminate doubt caused by the Dred Scott decision on the issue of 
citizenship. He said: "It settles the great question of citizenship and 
removes all doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United 
States."319 In this statement Senator Howard is not explaining the meaning 
of the first sentence of section 1, but instead the purpose that the first 
sentence serves. 
Over the years many scholars have debated the weight that judges 
interpreting a legislative measure should give to the purpose of the 
legislature that enacted it. Professors Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. 
Sacks prominently supported the "purposive" school of statutory 
interpretation. They advocated that courts should determine "what purpose 
ought to be attributed to the statute" and then "interpret the words of the 
statute immediately in question so as to carry out the purpose as best it 
can."320 In contrast, the textualist school of statutory interpretation, 
typified by Justice Antonin Scalia, holds that the objective meaning of the 
language used in legislative measures controls; courts generally are not to 
depart from the objective meaning merely based on legislative purpose. 
Justice Scalia wrote: 
To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be too dull 
to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is 
designed . . . to serve; or too hide-bound to realize that new 
times require new laws. One need only hold the belief that 
judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes 
or write those new laws.321  
Regardless of which side of the debate has the better argument, it is 
indisputable that the Supreme Court sometimes has looked to the 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment for evidence of its 
purpose and then used the purpose to decide issues. An excellent example 
is Strauder v. West Virginia.' In that case, the Supreme Court considered 
whether a state law that only permitted "white male persons" to serve on 
319 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2890, 2896 (May 30, 1866). 
320 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1374 (William N. Eskridge, 
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
321 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
322 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
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a jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment.323 The Court expressly 
endorsed a purposive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying 
that the Amendment "is to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes 
of its framers."3' Quoting its recent decision in the Slaughter-house 
Cases,' the Court declared that "the one pervading purpose" of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment was "the freedom of the 
slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the 
protection of the newly made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of 
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over them."326 
Because the law limiting jury service to white males discriminated on the 
basis of race, the Court concluded that it was unconstitutiona1.327 
The Strauder Court's holding with respect to racial discrimination in 
eligibility to serve on juries remains valid today. But the Court did not 
limit its remarks to this specific issue. The Court also discussed in dicta 
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to other forms of 
discrimination in jury eligibility. The Court said: 
[State law] may confine the selection to males, to 
freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to 
persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit 
this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose. 
Its aim was against discrimination because of race or 
color.328 
This dicta, some of which the Supreme Court has since repudiated,329 also 
is an example of purposive interpretation. The Court's statements rest on 
the logic that the Equal Protection clause does not prohibit discrimination 
against women, for example, because the purpose was to prevent 
discrimination on the basis of race. 
This final example pointedly shows that claims about the Fourteenth 
Amendment based on purpose may be more controversial than claims that 
rest on explanations of the meaning of H.R. Res. 127 or a comparison of 
the final text of H.R. Res. 127 to the text of prior proposals. Even if the 
legislative history supports conclusions about the purpose of a provision, 
opponents may charge that purposive interpretation is improper.33° They 
323 Id. at 305. 
324 Id. at 307. 
325 Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
326 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307 (quoting the Slaughter-house Cases). The Court in the Slaughter-
house Cases apparently did not think it was necessary to cite specific passages in the legislative history 
to establish this purpose, saying that the events motivating them arc "almost too recent to be called 
history, but which are familiar to us all." Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. at 71. 
327 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. 
328 Id. at 310. 
329 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) (holding that states cannot exclude 
women as a class from serving on juries). 
330 E.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2010) 
("[T]extualism emphasizes that judges . .. have a duty to enforce clearly worded statutes as written, 
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may assert, for example, that nothing in the text of section 1 limits the 
guarantee of equal protection to matters of race and not of sex, and judges 
cannot legitimately rewrite the text based on purpose. 
Writers often disagree about the level of generality at which to identify 
Congress's purpose. For example, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co.,' the Supreme Court considered whether a municipal program that 
gave contracting preferences to minority-owned businesses violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Marshall asserted in dissent that they did 
not. Making a claim about original meaning based on Congress's evident 
purpose, he wrote: 
Congress' concern in passing the Reconstruction 
Amendments, and particularly their congressional 
authorization provisions, was that States would not 
adequately respond to racial violence or discrimination 
against newly freed slaves. To interpret any aspect of these 
Amendments as proscribing state remedial responses to 
these very problems turns the Amendments on their heads.' 
The majority saw a more general purpose, namely, preventing unequal 
treatment. The majority said, with emphasis: "The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that In]o State shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.'"333 The Court observed that favoring any one group of contractors 
would harm others. The Court thus concluded that all racial 
discrimination, whether aimed at helping or hanning minorities, must be 
subjected to strict scrutiny.334 
Writers should take this potential ground of impeachment into account 
by acknowledging all possible purposes and then expressly addressing 
why they are choosing one over the others. Judge Robert Bork took this 
approach in discussing the Brown v. Board of Education335 decision from 
an originalist perspective. He acknowledged that "[t]he ratifiers [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] probably assumed that segregation was 
consistent with equality but they were not addressing segregation."336 In 
other words, their purpose was not to end segregation. But they also had 
another purpose. Judge Bork wrote, "The text itself demonstrates that the 
equality under law was the primary goal."" What should be done in this 
situation? Judge Bork said that when there is a conflict between the 
primary purpose and some other purpose, the primary purpose must 
even if there is reason to believe that the text may not perfectly capture the .. . purposes that inspired 
their enactment."). 
33 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
332 Id. at 559 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 493. 
334 Id.  
347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
336 ROBERT H. BORIC, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 82 
(1990). 
37 Id. 
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prevail. He explained: "By 1954, when Brown came up for decision, it had 
been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever produced 
equality. . . . Since equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, 
though the ratifiers did not understand that, both could not be honored."338 
 
D. Silence 
Writers sometimes rely on silence in the legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when making claims about what Congress 
originally intended the Amendment to mean. The theory appears to be that 
the House and Senate thoroughly discussed H.R. Res. 127 before voting 
to approve it, and it is therefore unlikely that Congress intended the 
Fourteenth Amendment to have a meaning that the representatives and 
senators never mentioned. One example of this type of reasoning appears 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.' In that case, a white 
applicant claimed a state university's consideration of race in its medical 
school admissions process violated the Equal Protection clause. Justice 
Brennan wrote an opinion, joined by three others, in which he concluded 
that the admissions policy was constitutional even though it was not race 
neutral. Justice Brennan relied in part on silence in the legislative history 
in rejecting the applicant's claim. He wrote: 
Nothing whatever in the legislative history of either the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Acts even 
remotely suggests that the States are foreclosed from 
furthering the fundamental purpose of equal opportunity to 
which the Amendment and those Acts are addressed. . . . We 
therefore conclude that [the university's] goal of admitting 
minority students disadvantaged by the effects of past 
discrimination is sufficiently important to justify use of race-
conscious admissions criteria.' 
Although arguments from silence have some strength, they invite 
three counterarguments. First, these arguments rest on the questionable 
premise that the legislative history contains complete evidence of what 
Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to mean. But we know that 
the legislative history is incomplete. The Journal of the Joint Committee, 
for example, does not contain any record of the Committee's debates. 
Maybe a member of the Committee said something relevant to the issue in 
Bakke but the remark has been lost to history. In addition, as described 
above, the House and Senate debated H.R. Res. 127 in haste, discussing 
its many provisions on only a handful of days. Their conversations were 
not as extensive as they might have been. 
Second, arguments from silence may rest on the questionable premise 
that Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve specific 
results rather than to establish generally applicable principles. In The Path 
338 Id 
339 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
34° Id. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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of the Law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes offered this instructive tale: 
There is a story of a Vermont justice of the peace before 
whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another for 
breaking a chum. The justice took time to consider, and then 
said that he ha[d] looked through the statutes and could find 
nothing about chums, and gave judgment for the 
defendant.' 
The lesson of this tale is that the hypothetical justice failed to see that 
a general principle (i.e., a defendant may be liable for damaging the 
property of another) may apply to new circumstances (i.e., broken chums) 
even if no one previously thought to discuss those specific circumstances. 
Similarly, a critic of the plurality's reasoning in Bakke might argue that 
discrimination against a white medical school applicant may violate the 
general principle of Equal Protection even if no one specifically discussed 
this kind of discrimination during debates over H.R. Res. 127. 
Third, arguments about silence in the legislative history often can be 
flipped around, showing that they are not very strong. For example, 
suppose that the issue is whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
separate but equal high school locker rooms for boys and girls. Suppose 
further that the legislative history is silent on the issue. One writer might 
argue that separate but equal locker rooms are constitutional because no 
representative or senator said that the Fourteenth Amendment would 
prohibit them. But another writer might respond that having separate but 
equal locker rooms is unconstitutional because no representative or 
senator said the Fourteenth Amendment would allow them. Any writer 
making an argument from silence should anticipate this kind of response. 
E. Contemporaneous Congressional Actions 
Jurists and scholars also sometimes base claims about what the 39th 
Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to mean on evidence of 
how the same Congress handled related matters.' This method rests on 
the assumption that Congress would have wanted to act consistently 
during the spring of 1866.343 One example appears in Justice Breyer' s 
dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. I.' In that case, Justice Breyer concluded that state laws 
assigning children to attend public schools according to the children's race 
for the purpose of promoting school integration did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause even if the busing was not directed solely at remedying 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474 (1897). 
saz For an impressive survey of actions taken by the Reconstruction Congress, see David P. 
Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. Cm. L. REV. 383 (2008). 
This is akin to the First Congress canon, which is based on the premise that the actions of the 
Framers and the "contemporaries of the Constitution" "provide unique insights" into its meaning. 
Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court's Use of History, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1745, 1747 (2006). 
aaa 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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past discrimination in school assignments." Justice Breyer supported his 
conclusion by asserting: 
There is reason to believe that those who drafted [the] 
Amendment . . . would have understood the legal and 
practical difference between the use of race-conscious 
criteria . . to keep the races apart, and the use of race-
conscious criteria . . . to bring the races together.' 
He cited as evidence to support this claim various federal efforts to 
ameliorate the conditions of former slaves during reconstruction.347 In 
other words, Congress would not have intended the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prohibit measures aimed at integrating African-Americans 
because Congress itself undertook such measures. 
This method of discerning the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has the strength of relying on objective demonstrations of 
Congress's intent. Actions often speak louder than words. Because 
Congress enacted the Freedman's Bureau Act, we can conclude with 
certainty that a majority of the House and Senate supported the Act's 
provisions. In contrast, even if Senator Howard or Representative Stevens 
gave a speech in which they clearly defined the meaning of terms in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, no one can say for sure whether the rest of the 
Senate or anyone in the House agreed with them. Congress votes to 
support acts, but does not vote to support floor statements. 
But this method has three potential weaknesses that proponents must 
recognize and address. First, congressional actions taken before the 
Fourteenth Amendment became effective do not necessarily indicate what 
Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to permit. Congress may 
have wanted the Fourteenth Amendment to impose new limitations on the 
States. For example, prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected only certain enumerated rights." 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to have gone further in 
its broadly stated Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or 
Immunities Clauses.' 
Second, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms limits 
only the states and does not limit Congress. Congress may have thought 
that it had power to take actions that the Fourteenth Amendment would 
345 Id. at 803 -04, 820. 
346 Id. at 829. 
347 See id. at 829--30 (citing, among other things, RICHARD SEARS, A UTOPIAN EXPERIMENT IN 
KENTUCKY: INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL EQUALITY AT BEREA, 1866-1904 (1996), and ROGER 
FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1862 77, at 51 (1974)). 
This included the "rigbt. . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue" and be sued, "to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property; and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 
(1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1952)). 
349 See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 721 (1989) ("Many of the Members of the 
39th Congress viewed § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment as `constitutionalizing' and expanding the 
protections of the 1866 Act ... ."). 
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preclude the states from taking.35° For example, Congress may have 
believed that the Equal Protection clause would limit state governments in 
ways that the Bill of Rights—which does not contain an express guarantee 
of Equal Protection—would not. Congress, for example, might be able to 
pass laws helping African Americans that states could not.351  
Third, this method of making claims about the original meaning 
usually relies on argument by analogy. Any claim by analogy necessarily 
rests on an assumption that things which resemble each other in some ways 
must resemble each other in another way.' Analogies are often helpful in 
law; a First Amendment precedent that applies to flag burning might also 
apply to defacing a state seal based on an analogy of flags to seals. But 
every analogy must fail at some point because two things are never 
completely the same.353 In Parents Involved in Community Schools,354 for 
instance, Justice Breyer analogized the race conscious measures that the 
39th Congress approved to the race conscious school assignments at 
issue.355 Justice Breyer concluded that if Congress thought that the former 
were lawful, then by analogy Congress would not have intended the 
Fourteenth to prohibit the latter.356 But the measures are not identical. 
Despite the similarities of the two practices, Congress may have seen 
differences that it considered important. A stronger opinion would have 
explained why the differences should not matter. 
VI. GENERAL PROBLEMS TO AVOID 
When writers rely on the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in making claims about its original meaning, they should take 
into account all potential grounds upon which others might impeach their 
reasoning. The preceding discussion of five different methods of using the 
legislative history identified possible weaknesses of each method. What 
follows is a discussion of three more general problems to avoid. 
A. Overlooking Conflicting Evidence 
One general problem is overlooking conflicting evidence. Justice 
Antonin Scalia famously condemned efforts to use legislative history to 
Justice Harlan's dissent in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), a case that dealt with 
involuntary expatriation of citizens, raised this point. The Court held that Congress, like the states, 
could not deprive citizenship from an unwilling citizen. Id. at 267. Justice Harlan wrote: "Nothing in 
the debates, however, supports the Court's assertion that the clause was intended to deny Congress its 
authority to expatriate unwilling citizens." Id. at 284 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
351 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,563-65 (1990) (granting deference to Congress 
that would not be granted to states in determining the validity of race conscious measures), overruled 
in part, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,226-27 (1995). 
352 See W. WARD FEARNSIDE & WILLIAM B. HOLTHER, FALLACY: THE COUNTERFEIT OF 
ARGUMENT 23 (1959) (explaining that reasoning by analogy will break down at some point because 
the two things are not identical and therefore do not share all possible properties). 
3" See id. 
354 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
"5 Id. at 829-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
3S6 Id. 
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discern the meaning of statutes in part because he believed that these 
efforts are often selective.' In one opinion, he recounted that "Judge 
Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the 
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads 
of the guests for one's friends."' In other words, researchers look for 
comments that support their position and ignore contradictory statements. 
The same criticism may apply to claims about the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that rely on a few apt statements in Volume 36 of 
the Congressional Globe.359 
Professor Charles Fairman advanced this type of criticism in his 
influential article addressing the question of whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.36° Professor Fairman 
recognized that Senator Howard had said that "[t]he great object of the 
first section of this amendment" is to make the guarantees of the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution applicable to the states.' But Professor 
Fairman questioned whether this choice comment was enough to prove the 
original meaning. He remarked: 
Here at last is a clear statement that the new privileges and 
immunities clause is intended to incorporate the federal Bill 
of Rights. For the first time, "the first eight amendments" are 
specified. On this point Howard's statement seems full and 
unequivocal. It must be given very serious consideration, 
coming from the Senator who had the measure in charge. 
The question then becomes: did the Senate agree, did the 
House agree, did the State Legislatures that ratified the 
Amendment agree, that this was what the clause meant?' 
Professor Fairman recognized that Representative Bingham appeared 
to share Senator Howard's view, but saw little evidence that others did.363 
As Professor Fairman put it, "What is all. The rest of the evidence bore in 
the opposite direction, or was indifferent."' Whether Professor Fairman 
is correct in his conclusion is a topic of some debate.365 The important 
point, though, is that the kind of criticism he raises—that a few comments 
are not enough to prove original meaning—is something all people who 
write about the Fourteenth Amendment must take into account.366 
357 See SCALIA, supra note 321, at 35-36. 
358 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993). 
359 See supra Section II.A. 
36° Fairman, supra note 8, at 58. 
361 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2766 (May 23, 1866). 
362 Fairman, supra note 8, at 58. 
363 Id.  
364 Id. at 65. 
365 See Pamela Brandwein, Dueling Histories.• Charles Fairman and William Crosskey 
Reconstruct "Original Understanding,"30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 289, 300 (1996) (describing the debate 
over whether Professor Fairman's criticism of Justice Black was correct). 
366 Justice Thomas took this point into account in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999), a case that held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited the states from imposing durational residency requirement for public benefits. Id. at 503— 
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The only way to avoid or defeat this kind of criticism is to conduct 
thorough research and confront contrary evidence. Historical research 
often yields ambiguities. In some cases, the researcher must determine and 
explain which conclusions are best supported. Justice Kennedy illustrated 
this approach in Alden v. Maine.' Although that case did not involve the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it concerned an issue of original meaning.368 The 
question in the case was whether the Constitution stripped the states of 
their sovereign immunity.369 Justice Kennedy recognized that some 
statements made during the ratification of the Constitution supported this 
view, but he found the other side better supported.' After considering the 
competing sources, he summarized: 
In short, the scanty and equivocal evidence offered . 
establishes no more than . . . that some members of the 
founding generation disagreed with Hamilton, Madison, 
Marshall, Iredell, and the only state conventions formally to 
address the matter. The events leading to the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment, however, make clear that the 
individuals who believed the Constitution stripped the States 
of their immunity from suit were at most a small minority.37' 
Here, Justice Kennedy acknowledged contrary evidence but based his 
conclusion on what appeared to be the majority view." When 
evidence points in more than one direction, judges and scholars 
usually should take this approach and should not overstate the 
certainty of their conclusions.' 
04. In arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to protect fundamental rights, not 
public benefits, Justice Thomas cautiously relied on the drafters' statements only after providing other 
supporting evidence, writing: 
That Members of the 39th Congress appear to have endorsed the wisdom of Justice 
Washington's opinion does not, standing alone, provide dispositive insight into 
their understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities 
Clause. Nevertheless, their repeated references to the Corfield decision, combined 
with what appears to be the historical understanding of the Clause's operative 
terms, supports the inference that, at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted, people understood that "privileges or immunities of citizens" were 
fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law. 
Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
367 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722-23 (1999). 
368 See e.g., id. at 714 ("The Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original document: 
'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.'"). 
369 Id at 759--60. 
370 Id. at 726. 
371 Id 
372 Id. 
171 In Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), the Court held that the Citizenship Clause prohibited 
Congress from enacting a statute that involuntarily expatriated U.S. citizenship from those who voted 
in a foreign election. Id at 267. The Court relied on Senator Howard's statement to show that the 
purpose of the Amendment was "to put this question of citizenship . . beyond the legislative power," 
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B. Taking Statements out of Context 
Another general problem to avoid is taking statements from the 
legislative history out of context. The 39th Congress was busy during its 
first session. As described above, Congress seriously considered four 
proposals for constitutional amendments: H.R. Res. 9, H.R. Res. 51, H.R. 
Res. 63, and H.R. Res. 127. Congress also passed the bill that became the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.37' Members of Congress made numerous 
statements during debates about these provisions, and many of these 
statements relate to subjects that the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately 
addressed. But in the end, only H.R. Res. 127 received the requisite 
approval and became the Fourteenth Amendment. Statements made during 
debates over other matters, accordingly, provide only limited evidence of 
what Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to mean. 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. 
Doe.' That case concerned a Texas law that sought to exclude from 
public schools certain children who were present in the state in violation 
of immigration laws.' Advocates for the children argued that law 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, but Texas responded that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not apply to noncitizens who are not lawfully 
present.377 The Equal Protection Clause says that no state shall "deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 
Ruling against Texas, the Court concluded: "Congress, by using the phrase 
`person within its jurisdiction,' sought expressly to ensure that the equal 
protection of the laws was provided to the alien population.' To support 
this claim about the original meaning, the Court quoted Representative 
Bingham, who asked rhetorically: "Is it not essential to the unity of the 
Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens 
or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in 
this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?,)380 
A potential ground for impeaching the Court's reasoning on this point 
is that Representative Bingham was not speaking about H.R. Res. 127, the 
resolution that became the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, 
Representative Bingham was speaking about H.R. Res. 63, a differently 
and Congress had no power to cause an involuntary forfeiture of citizenship. Id. at 263. Justice 
Harlan's dissent provided another statement from Senator Howard that a person can cease to be a 
citizen by "'the commission of some crime" to show that the Citizenship Clause left intact Congress's 
power to cause an involuntary forfeiture of citizenship. Id. at 286 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2895). The Court recognized the "conflicting inferences" from the 
legislative history and relied also on the text and purpose of the Clause and other precedents. Id. at 
267 (majority opinion). 
374 See supra text accompanying notes 102-109 (discussing passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866). 
375 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
376 Id at 205 -206. 
377 1d. at 210. 
378 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
379 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 214. 
3g1) Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 1090). 
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worded resolution that the House approved but the Senate did not.' 
Unlike H.R. Res. 127, H.R. Res. 63 did not guarantee "equal protection of 
the laws" but instead guaranteed "equal protection in the rights of life, 
liberty and property."382 It is true that the two phrases dealt with similar 
subject matters and may have had similar meanings. But the Court's 
reasoning in Plyler is incomplete because it does not address this issue or 
explain why it is looking at comments concerning H.R. Res. 63 instead of 
comments concerning H.R. Res. 127. Without more explanation, the 
relevance of Representative Bingham's statement is difficult to gauge and 
does little to support the Court's conclusion. 
Writers who rely on statements made during congressional debates to 
make claims about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should take two steps to strengthen their arguments. First, they should 
identify the speaker whom they are quoting, the date on which the speaker 
spoke, and the particular measure that the speaker was discussing. Second, 
if the speaker was addressing a measure other than H.R. Res. 127 (or an 
early draft of H.R. Res. 127), they also should explain in detail why the 
speaker's statement may show what Congress intended when it approved 
the final version of H.R. Res. 127. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court 
omitted this second step. 
C. Using Methodology Selectively 
A third general problem to avoid is a selective or inconsistent use of 
methods for making claims about the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Section V of this Article identified five methods for using 
the legislative history to make claims about the original meaning: relying 
on express statements about meaning, comparing drafts, looking at 
purpose, drawing inferences from silence, and looking at other 
contemporaneous actions?' Writers may be tempted to choose whichever 
methods best support the claim that they wish to make without addressing 
the other methods. Or they may rely on a method that they would not use 
in other contexts. 
For example, as explained above, writers sometimes based claims 
about the original meaning on evidence of purpose or contemporary 
actions of Congress.3" Justice Breyer took this approach in his dissent in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools.' He concluded that the purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to bring the races together, and that 
assigning children to schools by race in order to promote diversity 
therefore did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.' One question to 
ask is whether other methods of relying on the legislative history would 
produce the same result. A second question is whether Justice Breyer 
The Court knew that Representative Bingham was addressing H.R. Res. 63, and erroneously 
said that this resolution "was to become the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. 
382 See supra text accompanying note 209 (discussing quoting H.R. Res. 63). 
383 See supra Section V. 
See supra Section V.C, E. 
ass Parents Involved v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
386 Id. at 801-04. 
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would use the same kind of purposive methodology in other Equal 
Protection cases, such as those involving challenges to laws discriminating 
against homosexuality. Although this example involves Justice Breyer, the 
same questions could apply to anyone. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment consists of 
statements by Representatives and Senators, drafts of proposed 
amendments, committee reports, and other materials. This Article has 
outlined what might be considered a four-step process for using this 
legislative history to make or assess claims about its original meaning. The 
first step is to locate the pertinent sources—such as Volume 36 of the 
Congressional Globe and the Journal of the Joint Committee—and to find 
relevant evidence. Although the sources are now available online, this first 
step is still difficult because those sources are not all electronically 
searchable and because the process by which Congress ultimately 
approved the text of what is now the Fourteenth Amendment is 
complicated. This guide may provide some assistance in finding pertinent 
information. 
The second step is to become familiar with some of the background 
necessary for understanding the legislative history. Many of the concerns 
of Congress in 1865 and 1866 are not our concerns today, and it is difficult 
to discern what the Senators and Representatives were seeking to 
accomplish without first understanding the context in which they acted. 
This guide has attempted to describe some of the concerns that motivated 
Congress to address the topics in each section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The third step is to make a claim about the original meaning using the 
legislative history. As explained in some depth, writers have at least five 
methods of using the legislative history to make claims. They may rely on 
express statements, a comparison of drafts, evidence of purpose, 
inferences from silence, or other contemporaneous official actions. But 
other methods are also possible. A common theme, though, is that writers 
can strengthen their claims by thoroughly explaining their assumptions, 
inferences, and logic. 
The fourth step is to consider whether there might be reasonable 
grounds for impeaching a claim about the original meaning. Each of the 
five methods discussed above has important strengths and weaknesses. 
This guide also has discussed three general problems to avoid: ignoring 
contrary evidence, taking comments out of context, and selectively using 
particular methods for making claims about the original meaning. 
Acknowledging and addressing possible weaknesses in claims about the 
original meaning is better than ignoring them. 
As noted at the start of this guide, the question of what the Fourteenth 
Amendment originally meant is distinct from the question of whether 
courts should follow the original meaning. This guide has addressed only 
claims concerning the former question; the latter question is much debated 
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and addressed elsewhere. Put simply, it is possible to be interested in 
knowing the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment with or 
without believing that original meaning still controls today. 
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APPENDIX A: PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
This appendix contains the text of proposed constitutional 
amendments that Congress considered between December 1865 and June 
1866. 
H.R. Res. 9 
The House approved the following proposed constitutional 
amendment by a two-thirds vote on December 19, 1865. The proposal did 
not come to a vote in the Senate. It addressed payment of Confederate 
debts, a subject ultimately covered by section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
No tax, duty, or impost shall be laid, nor shall any 
appropriation of money be made, by either the United States, 
or any one of the States thereof, for the purpose of paying, 
either in whole or in part, any debt, contract, or liability 
whatsoever, incurred, made, or suffered by any one or more 
of the States, or the people thereof, for the purpose of aiding 
rebellion against the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.387 
 
H.R. Res. 51 
The House approved this proposed amendment by a two-thirds vote 
on January 31, 1866. The Senate voted on March 9 and the provision 
received the support of a majority of the senators but less than the required 
two-thirds. It addresses the subject of representation of the former 
Confederate states in a Congress, a subject ultimately covered by section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States which may be included within this Union according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed; Provided, 
That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or 
abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons 
of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of 
representation.'" 
H.R. Res. 63 
The House debated this proposed constitutional amendment 
extensively in February 1866 but did not vote on it. The Senate did not 
consider it. It addressed civil rights and the powers of Congress, subjects 
ultimately covered by sections one and five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall 
387 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 84. 
'Id. at 535. 
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be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each 
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States (Art. 4, Sec. 2), and to all persons in the several States 
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property 
(5th Amendment).389 
The Joint Committee's April 21 Draft of What Became H.R. Res. 127 
Representative Stevens introduced the following five-part proposed 
amendment to the Joint Committee on April 21, 1866. The Joint 
Committee made a number of revisions before introducing it into the 
House as H.R. Res. 127. 
Sec. 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by 
the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one 
thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination 
shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to 
the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage, 
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight 
hundred and seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right 
of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by 
any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation. 
Sec. 4. Debts incurred in aid of insurrection or of war against 
the Union, and claims of compensation for loss of 
involuntary service or labor, shall not be paid by any state 
nor by the United States. 
Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.390 
H.R. Res. 127 as Introduced into Congress 
Representative Stevens introduced H.R. Res. 127 into the House on 
behalf of the Joint Committee on April 30, 1866. The House passed it 
without amendment on May 10. 
Sec. 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
3" Id. at 1034. 
390 See KENDRICK, supra note 37, at 83-84 . 
2017] 	 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 	 1131 
Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States which may be included within this 
Union, according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians 
not taxed. But whenever, in any State, the elective franchise 
shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less 
than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged except 
for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of 
representation in such State shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear 
to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-
one years of age. 
Sec. 3. Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, 
all persons who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, 
giving it aid and comfort, shall be excluded 
from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress, and 
for electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States. 
Sec. 4. Neither the United States nor any State shall assume 
or pay any debt or obligation already incurred, or which may 
hereafter be incurred, in aid of insurrection or of war against 
the United States, or any claim for compensation for loss of 
involuntary service or labor. 
Sec. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.391  
H.R. Res. 127 as Approved by the Senate and House and Then Ratified by 
the States (thus Becoming the Fourteenth Amendment): 
After the House approved H.R. Res. 127, the Senate modified it and 
approved it by a two-thirds vote on June 8, 1866. The House then approved 
the H.R. Res. 127 as amended on June 10, 1866. The President transmitted 
the approved version to the states on June 2, 1866. The Secretary of State 
certified that three-quarters of the states had ratified the proposal on July 
28, 1868. It thus became the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof; are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
391 CONG. GLOBE, supra note 27, at 2286. 
1132 	 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 49:1069 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at 
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, 
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members 
of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the 
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in 
such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold 
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under 
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive 
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of 
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds 
of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United 
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for 
payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.392 
392 U.S. CONST. amend. X1V. 
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APPENDIX B: TIMELINE 
Apr. 8, 1864: The Senate approves S. Res. 16 (which became the 
Thirteenth Amendment) by a vote of 38 to 6. 
June 15, 1864: The House of Representatives initially defeats the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
Jan. 31, 1865: The House of Representatives passes the Thirteenth 
Amendment (S.J. Res. 16) by a vote of 119 to 56. 
Feb. 1, 1865: President Abraham Lincoln signs a Joint Resolution 
submitting the proposed Thirteenth Amendment to the states. 
Apr. 9, 1865: Lee surrenders to Grant. 
Apr. 15, 1865: Lincoln is assassinated. 
Dec. 4, 1865: 39th Congress convenes 
Dec. 18, 1865: Secretary of State William Seward issues a statement 
verifying the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Jan. 9, 1866: Joint Committee convenes. 
Jan. 12, 1866: Joint Committee approves the draft of a constitutional 
amendment proposed by Representative Conklin on 
representation, and sends it to Congress where it is introduced as 
H.R. Res. 51. 
Feb. 4, 1866: Joint Committee approves the draft of a constitutional 
amendment proposed by Representative Bingham granting 
Congress the power to enforce privileges and immunities, and 
sends it to Congress. 
Feb. 28, 1866: Facing opposition, House postpones consideration of 
Bingham amendment. 
Mar. 27, 1866: Senate fails to pass Conklin amendment by two-thirds 
vote. 
Mar. 27, 1866: President Johnson vetoes Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
Apr. 9, 1866: Congress overrides Johnson's veto of Civil Rights Act 
of 1866. 
Apr. 21, 1866: Joint Committee begins to discuss Representative 
Owen's proposal for an amendment. 
Apr. 28, 1866: 	 Joint Committee approves draft of Fourteenth 
Amendment, based on the Owen Proposal, with amendments 
proposed by Representative Bingham, and sends it to Congress. 
May 30, 1866: Senate adds the first sentence to §1 on citizenship. 
June 18, 1866: House and Senate jointly approve Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
June 25, 1866: Connecticut ratifies. 
July 6, 1866: New Hampshire ratifies. 
July 7, 1866: Tennessee ratifies. 
Feb 7, 1867: Delaware rejects. 
Mar. 2, 1867: Congress passes reconstruction acts requiring the states 
to ratify in order to be readmitted to the union. 
July 8, 1868: Louisiana and South Carolina ratify. 
July 28, 1868: Secretary of State announces three-fourths of the states 
have ratified. 
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APPENDIX C: TABLE OF SPEAKERS 
This table lists the representatives and senators who made comments 
on the proposed constitutional amendments described in Section III. 
Following each name is the starting page of each comment in Volume 36 
of the Congressional Globe. 
H.R. Res. 9 
Rep. Bingham, John (Ohio): 86 
Rep. Farnsworth, John F. (Ill.): 85 
Rep. Hale, Robert S. (N.Y.): 86 
Rep. Higby, William (Cal.): 86 
Rep. Ingersoll, Ebon C. (Ill.): 86, 87 
Rep. Johnson, Philip (Pa.): 86, 87 
Rep. Niblack, William E. (Ind.): 86 
Rep. Randall, Samuel J. (Pa.): 87 
Rep. Rogers, Andrew (N.J.): 84, 85, 86, 87 
H.R. Res. 51 
Rep. Benjamin, John F. (Mo.): 535, 536 
Rep. Raymond, Henry J. (N.Y.): 536-538 
Rep. Schenck, Robert C. (Ohio): 535 
Rep. Stevens, Thaddeus (Penn.) 536, 537 
Rep. Thomas, J.L. (Maryland): App. 58 
Sen. Anthony, Henry B. (R.I.): 964, 1285 
Sen. Buckalew, Charles R. (Pa.): 957, 958, 
959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965 
Sen. Chandler, Zachariah (Mich.): 885 
Sen. Clark, Daniel (N.H.): 831, 832, 833, 
834, 835, 1284, 1287 
Sen. Conness, John (Cal.): 1284 
Sen. Cowan, Edgard (Pa.): 1285, 1286 
Sen. Creswell, John A. (Md.): 1285 
Sen. Davis, Garrett (Ky.): 1288 
Sen. Doolittle, James R. (Wis.): 983, 984, 
1232, 1287 
Rep. Rousseau, Lovell H. (Ky.): 85 
Rep. Shellabarger, Samuel (Ohio): 85, 86 
Rep. Sloan, Ithamar C. (Wis.): 86 
Rep. Smith, Green Clay (Ky.): 87 
Rep. Stevens, Thaddeus (Pa.): 85 
Rep. Wilson, James F. (Iowa): 84, 85, 86, 
87 
Rep. Wright, Edwin R. V. (N.J.): 87 
Sen. Howe, Timothy 0. (Wis.): 886, 983, 
984 
Sen. Johnson, Revardy (Md.): 763, 764, 
765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 984 
Sen. Lane, Henry S. (Ind.): 736, 737, 738, 
739, 740, 741, 742 
Sen. McDougall, James A. (Cal.): 1282, 
1283, 1287 
Sen. Morrill, Lot M. (Me): App. 151 
Sen. Pomeroy, Samuel C. (Kan.): 1180, 
1181,1182,1183,1184 
Sen. Saulsbury, Willard (Del.): App. 
Sen. Sherman, John (Ohio): 981, 982, 
1284, 1287 
Sen. Stewart, William M. (Nev.): 1257, 
1280 
Sen. Sumner, Charles (Mass.): 673, 674, 
Sen. Fessenden, William Pitt (Me.): 702, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 
703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 876, 965, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 1224, 1225, 
982, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 
991, 1275, 1276, 1277, 	 1278, 1279, 1232, 1281, 1282, 1287, 1288 
1280, 1281 Sen. Trumbell, Lyman (Ill.): 984, 1284, 
Sen. Henderson, John B. (Mo): 1283, App. 1285 
115 Sen. Wilson, Henry S. (Mass.): 965, 1254, 
Sen. Hendricks, Thomas A. (Ind.): 876, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1282 
877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 
885 
Sen. Yates, Richard (Ill.): 1255, 1256 
2017] 	 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 	 1135 
H.R. Res. 63 
Rep. Bingham, John A. (Ohio): 1034, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1093, 1094 
Rep. Davis, Thomas (N.Y.): 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087 
Rep. Hale, Robert S, (N.Y.): 1034, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066 
Rep. Higby, William (Cal.): 1054, 1055, 1056 
Rep. Hotchkiss, Giles W. (N.Y.): 1095 
Rep. Kelley, William D. (Pa.): 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1063 
Rep. Price, Hiram (Iowa): 1066, 1067 
Rep. Randall, Samuel J. (Pa.): 1057 
Rep. Woodbridge, Frederick E. (Vt.): 1088 
H.R. Res. 127 
Comments in the House: 2286, 2332, 2433, 2458, 2498, 2530, 3055, 3144, 3177, 3241, 
3276, 3356, 3357 
Sen. Conness, John (Cal.): 2891, 2892 
Sen. Cowan, Edgard (Pa.): 2890, 2891, 2899, 2900, 2987, 2988, 2989, 2990, 2991 
Sen. Davis, Garrett (Ky.): 2918, 2919, 3041 
Sen. Doolittle, James R. (Wis.): 2892, 2893, 2895, 2896, 2897, 2900, 2901, 2914, 2915, 
2916, 2917, 2918, 2942, 2943, 2944, 2984, 2985, 2986, 3040 
Sen. Edmunds, George F. (Va.): 2944 
Sen. Fessenden, William Pitt (Me.): 3010 
Sen. Guthrie, James (Ky.): 2899 
Sen. Henderson, John B. (Mo): 2992, 3010, 3011, 3031, 3032, 3033, 3034, 3035, 3036 
Sen. Hendricks, Thomas A. (Ind.): 2894, 2895, 2897, 2898, 2899, 2938, 2939, 2940, 2941, 
2986, 2991, 2992, 2993, 3039, 3040 
Sen. Howard, Jacob M. (Mich.): 2890, 2895, 2900, 2942, 3011, 3038, 3039 
Sen. Howe, Timothy 0. (Wis.): App. 217 
Sen. Johnson, Revardy (Md.): 2893, 2894, 2898, 2899, 2916, 2991, 3026, 3027, 3028, 
3029, 3030, 3041 
Sen. McDougall, James A. (Cal.): 3030, 3031, 3038, 3041 
Sen. Poland, Luke P. (Vt.): 2961, 2962, 2963, 2964 
Sen. Saulsbury, Willard (Del.): 2919, 2920, 2921 
Sen. Sherman, John (Ohio): 2899, 2942, 2986, 2987, 2992 
Sen. Stewart, William M (Nev.): 2964, 2965 
Sen. Trumbell, Lyman (Ill.): 2893, 2894, 2901, 2902 
Sen. Van Winkle, Peter G. (W.V.): 2897, 2898, 2900, 2941, 2942 
Sen. Willey, Waitman T. (W.V.): 2918, 2919 
Sen. Williams, George H. (Or.): 2897, 2944, 2991 
Sen. Wilson, Henry S. (Mass.): 2986, 2987 
Sen. Yates, Richard (Ill.): 3036, 3037, 3 

